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Delaware's Duty to Auction After
Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
QVC Network, Inc.
The Roaring Eighties were a new guilded age, where winning was celebrated at all
costs .... The investment bankers were part croupiers, part alchemists. They
conjured up wild schemes, pounded out new and more outlandish computer runs
to justify them, then twirled their temptations before executives in a "devil
dance."
Why did these people care so much about what came out of their computers and
so little about what came out of their factories? Why were they so intent on
breaking up instead of building up? And last- What did this all have to do with
doing business?'
I. INTRODUCTION
No age in recent American history has been more critically denounced
as a period of greed and waste than the "Roaring Eighties."2 During that
single decade, there were more corporate mergers and acquisitions than
at any other time in history.3 As a result, the typical corporate behemoth
1. BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR
NABISCo 514-15 (1990).
2. While this characterization is largely inaccurate inasmuch as many areas experi-
enced true growth and prosperity during the eighties, in the realm of corporate merg-
ers and acquisitions, the reputation is largely deserved. See Dan Shaw, Greedy for
More? The Eighties Sneak Back, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 2, 1994, at A43.
3. From 1980 to 1989 there were 31,114 completed merger, acquisition, or lever-
aged buy-out (LBO) deals with a total value of over $1,341,068,000,000. M & A Alma-
nac: 1989 Profile, MERGERS & ACQUISrITONS, May/June 1990, at 57; see Alex Devience,
Jr., A Hindsight Review of the Business Judgment Rule in a Takeover Environment:
The State of the Business Judgment Rule qfter the Fall, 5 DEPAuL Bus. W. 113, 113
(1993) (noting that the period was extremely active for takeover strategists). Although
the eighties undoubtedly win the race for the most merger and acquisition activity,
the nineties are catching up, and 1994 should be a record year. Gaining Momentum
For a Peak Year, MERGERS & AcQUISrIONS, Sept./Oct 1994, at 54-55 (noting that
while 1994 merger and acquisition activity is on a pace that could set a new one
year record for the highest number of transactions, the total value of these deals is
not likely to break the 1989 record); see News 10:30 p.m. E.T.: Business Year in
Review, Part 6-Merger Mania (CNN cable news broadcast, Dec. 20, 1994) (transcript
#427-6 available on LEXIS) (Lou Dobbs, anchor. "You'd think it was the
eighties-merger and acquisition activity heated up in 1994, running about 50% ahead
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is now older and wiser, and many are still nursing battle wounds.4
Whether the pain comes from payments on golden parachute agreements
or service payments on lingering "junk" bonds, many did not survive un-
scathed.5 Fortunately, some emerged revitalized and refreshed from their
going private "cocoons" as leaner, meaner fighting machines." What
made some companies come out ahead and some behind? More impor-
tantly, have we learned our lessons from the eighties or is more fumbling
around necessary before we graduate to a more civil merger environ-
ment?
Since Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,' the lines have been drawn
between the Delaware Supreme Court and the corporate board room.
The court's struggle to protect stockholder interests and require corpo-
rate responsibility from a board of directors without unduly interfering in
a board's decision-making process has undergone a gradual metamorpho-
sis of sorts.' The court's most recent step in this process came in Para-
of last year. In fact, more deals were announced in 1994 than at any time over the
past six years.").
4. Viacom is an ideal example of this phenomenon. See infra note 274. For a
discussion of the problem, see Fred R. Bleakley, Bad Hangover: Many irms ind
Debt They Piled On in 1980s Is a Cruet Taskmaster, WAL. ST. J., Oct. 9, 1990, at
Al (noting the considerable fiscal tightening and the looming specter of bankruptcy
highly leveraged companies may face as they attempt to grapple with their debt
loads).
5. "After a highly leveraged takeover, a steep percentage of the revenues pro-
duced by the acquired assets is diverted to paying the debt incurred to acquire the
assets." Martin Lipton, Takeover Abuses Mortgage the future, WAUL ST. J., Apr. 5,
1985; see Bleakley, supra note 4, at Al. Many companies, such as Interco, Corp., Al-
lied Stores Corp., and Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., did not survive at all. See
Devience, supra note 3, at 113 (citing George Anders & Francine Schindel, Costly Ad-
vice: Wall Streeters Helped Interco Defeat Raiders But at a Heavy Price, WALL ST. J.,
July 11, 1990, at Al (analyzing and recounting the history of the bankruptcy of
Interco, Inc.)).
6. This is most readily evident when comparing the strength of a company's ini-
tial public offering (IPO) and the company's value when it goes public again after an
LBO (also called a "Reverse LBO"). Recent examples of strength are Exide Corp. and
Ultratech Stepper, Inc. whose stock showed a 161% and 10996 increase respectively
from their IPO price and market price approximately one year later. Reverse LBOs,
MERGERS & AcQuismoNs, NoviDec. 1994, at 56. Examples of weakness are CMC
Industries and Cobra Industries, whose value dropped 66.7% and 66.1% respectively
within approximately eight months after they again went public. IL.
7. 493 A.2d 946 (DeL 1985); see supra notes 26-46 and accompanying text.
& Even highly respected commentators and practitioners who have tried to pre-
dict or comment on this metamorphosis have frequently summarized the trends in a
way the court promptly disproves. See, e.g., James C. Freund & Rodman Ward Jr.,
What's "In," "Out" in Takeovers In Wake of Paramount v. Time, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 26,
1990, at 22 (predicting that long-term plans are "in" and auctions are "out," citing
Time-Warner as a possible "full-employment act" for corporate planners and describ-
ing how "Delaware courts have been chipping away at Revlon almost since it first
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mount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.' (Paramount v.
QVC). In a case with far-reaching implications,' the court greatly en-
larged the number of circumstances that give rise to a Revlon duty to
auction." It also showed the narrowness of the board's discretion once
this duty has been activated and the difficulty in determining when that
duty attaches.'
2
How will this auction process impact corporate governance, the gener-
al public," and the stockholders it is designed to protect? This Com-
came down"). Lower courts fare little better when trying to predict the future. See,
e.g., City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 797 (DeL Ch.
1988) (describing a "front-end" partial tender offer as "already a largely vanished
breed' in 1988).
9. 637 A.2d 34 (DeL 1994).
10. This case will prove to have a much greater impact than the court may have
intended, despite the court's recitation of the typical disclaimer "We express no opin-
ion on any scenario except the actual facts before the Court, and our precise holding
herein. Unsolicited tender offers in other contexts may be governed by different pre-
cedent" Id at 43 n.13; see Thomas A. Gentile, Refining the Revlon Doctrine's Appli-
cability to Changes of ControL" Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network,
Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (DeL 1994), 17 HARV. J.L & PuB. POL'Y 895, 895, 902, 906 (1994).
11. For a discussion of Revlon duties, see infu text accompanying notes 67-70.
This expansion came primarily through the court's addition of all transactions involv-
ing a "change of control" to the list of Revlon triggering events, without considering
whether a breakup of the company was "inevitable." See i2ftra notes 168-205 and
accompanying text.
12. The Delaware high court held that Paramount's board of directors acted unrea-
sonably when it adopted certain defensive tactics to facilitate its merger with Viacom
and failed to adequately consider QVC's hostile bid. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at
47-50. In the process, the court found that "[tihe Paramount Board, albeit unintention-
ally, had 'inltlate[d] an active bidding process seeking to sell itself' by agreeing to sell
control of the corporation to Viacom in circumstances where another potential
acquirer (QVC) was equally interested in being a bidder.' Id, at 47 (emphasis added).
As this Comment will discuss, it is difficult to see how the actions of Paramount's
Board were different from those of other boards whose actions the court has deemed
reasonable. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154-55
(DeL 1989) ('Time's responsive action to Paramount's tender offer was not aimed at
'cramming down' on its shareholders a management sponsored alternative, but rather
had as its goal the carrying forward of a pre-existing transaction in an altered form.
Thus, the response was reasonably related to the threat." (footnote omitted)); see
infr notes 109-43 and accompanying text (analyzing Time-Warner).
13. Though obviously not the court's primary focus, it has been repeatedly noted
that the interests of the public and other third parties impact the court's balancing of
equities and awarding of equitable relief, such as mandating an auction or preventing
the triggering of a poison pill. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,
535 A.2d 1334, 1341-42 (DeL 1987) (permitting consideration of the impact a transac-
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ment suggests that while a focus on short-term stockholder benefit may
appear to most adequately serve stockholder interests, it in fact delivers
stockholders less than they would otherwise receive, even in change of
control situations. The mergad companies will also have a much more
difficult road ahead. In eighties parlance, they will more closely resemble
the wounded survivors than the revitalized victors." The problem is a
lack of attention to long-range planning. 5 Though giving lip service to
corporate strategy considerations, the court has effectively made final
price the ultimate arbiter. The purpose of this Comment is to propose a
modified analytical framework that more adequately considers long-range
goals.
Section II supplies the backdrop for the Paramount v. QVC decision
and discusses the progression of cases that have established Delaware's
apparent duty to auction." Once set in this historical perspective, Sec-
tion Ell analyzes Paramount v. QVC and its considerable expansion of
the instances in which a duty to auction attaches, a board's obligations
once this duty has attached, and the analysis the court would have made
tion will have on non-shareholder constituencies); City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership
v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 795 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("[I1t is essential for the court to
consider the offsetting equities... including the interests of the public and other
innocent third parties."). Two preeminent practitioners in the field have reasoned that
this focus on "economic and social utility" instead of shareholders' rights should be
the primary goal and justification for the continued legal recognition of the corporate
form. See Martin Upton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Gover-
nance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. C. L REV. 187, 188-90 (1991)
(proposing a plan whereby shareholders would elect their entire board of directors
once every five years in a single meeting focusing on long-range planning, to combat
the focus on short-term profits that could potentially destroy corporate profitability
and our free-market economy that has resulted from current law governing hostile
takeovers).
14. The highly leveraged company has been compared to a farmer who does not
rotate crops, fertilize, build fences, plant cover, or create windbreaks, and lets the
land lie fallow. "In the early years he will maximize his return from the land. But
inevitably the farm becomes a dust bowl." Lipton, supra note 5. Only in the past five
to seven years have commentators begun to recognize the way current policies have
strangled many companies who need to engage in long-range planning but have been
forced to focus on short-term profits to satisfy stockholders and the courts. See
Upton & Rosenblum, supra note 13, at 188-89, 205-10, n.61 (noting the problem of
.short-termism" and citing John G. Smale, What About Shareowner's Responsibility?
WAL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1987, at 24 ("by focusing on the short-term, our publicly held
business enterprises will see their competitive position decay); Alan Greenspan, Take-
overs Rooted in Fear, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 27, 1985, at 28) ("Excessively high discount
factors place a disproportionate share of the value of a company's stock on near-
term earnings and dividend flows.")).
15. This problem and the way it is exacerbated by many different national policies
ranging from tax policy to the whims of the stock market is discussed in Upton,
supra note 5; see also Upton & Rosenblum, supra note 13, at 210.
16. See ifra notes 21-143 and accompanying text.
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had it followed existing precedent and applied the Unocal test.' Section
IV evaluates the impact this decision will have on corporate governance
in the future, concluding that the present duty to auction trivializes a
board's assessment of the strategic value of a particular transaction,
precludes the possibility of peaceful merger negotiations in the future,
and can ultimately destroy corporations to "protect" the shareholders'
interests."' Section V advocates the application of the business judg-
ment rule to sale of control transactions after certain threshold questions
have been answered. These questions establish that the board acted in
good faith, was adequately informed, and used the utmost loyalty when
deciding to recommend a merger." Finally, Section VI concludes that a
modified business judgment rule applied to a narrow category of cases
will avoid the negative impact of the duty to auction in its present formu-
lation.
H. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Delaware corporate law has long recognized that the management of a
Delaware corporation's business and affairs is entrusted to its directors,
the elected and authorized representatives of the stockholders, and that
they are best suited for the task.2' The business judgment rule embodies
this principle. 2 The rule creates the presumption that in making a busi-
17. See infta notes 145-234 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 235-77 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 278-312 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 312 and accompanying text.
21. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
811-12 (DeL 1984) (clarifying the business judgment rule in Delaware). Section 141(a)
of the Delaware Code states
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except
as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorpo-
ration. If any such provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the
powers and duties conferred or Imposed upon the board of directors by this
chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by such person
or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of incorporation.
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1993).
22. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (DeL 1985) (A
hallmark of the business judgment rule is that a court will not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the board if the latter's decision can be 'attributed to any rational
business purpose.'") (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (DeL
1971)).
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ness decision, "the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis,
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company."' Under certain circumstances, however,
the Delaware Supreme Court has limited application of the business
judgment rule. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.' sets the standard
for application of the business judgment rule in takeover conflicts where
a target uses defensive tactics.'
A. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
In Unocal, a group of affiliated companies, collectively known as "Me-
sa," which held thirteen percent of Unocal's stock, commenced a two-tier
front-end loaded cash tender offer' to gain control of Unocal.' In the
23. Id.; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see Paramount v. QVC,
637 A.2d 34, 41-42 (Del. 1994). For an interesting suggestion for a new approach to
the business judgment rule in tender offer situations, see generally Alfred D.
Mathewson, Decisional Integrity and the Business Judgment Rule: A Theory, 17
PEPP. L REv. 879 (1990). For a historical discussion of the relevant case law that led
to the modem interpretation of the business judgment rule, see Devience, supra note
3, at 116-19; see also R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Busi-
ness Judgment Rule, 48 Bus. LAw. 1337, 1337-38, 1340-41 (1993) (discussing the three
major views of the business judgment rule after pronouncement of the American Law
Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations and
the origins of the presumption). For a discussion of the American Law Institute's
Corporate Governance Project, see generally Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care, The
Business Judgment Rule, and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance
Project, 48 Bus. LAw. 1355, 1374-76 (1993).
24. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1986).
25. One of the more significant results of Paramount v. QVC is the effect it will
have on defensive tactics in the future, but an extensive discussion of defensive tac-
tics is not within the scope of this Comment For some early commentary on defen-
sive tactics and their legal and economic justification, see generally Martin Upton &
Andrew R. Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibilities-An Up-
date, 40 Bus. LAw. 1403 (1985); Daniel J. Morrissey, Defensive Tactics in Tender
Offers-Does Anything Go? 53 TENN. L REv. 103 (1985). For a more modem discus-
sion, though still pre-QVC, see Robert A. Ragazzo, The Legitimacy of Takeover De-
fense in the '90s, 41 DEPAuL L REv. 689 (1992).
26. A "two-tier front-end loaded offer" generally refers to a cash offer for the first
5096 of the target's stock that produces a controlling share, followed by a purchase of
the remaining shares at a lower price, usually for subordinated debt or non-voting
equity shares of the acquiring company. See 5 Louis Loss & JOEL SEUGMAN, SECIU-
TIES REGULATION 2136-37 (3d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1993); Upton & Brownstein, supra
note 25, at 1412 (describing two-tier, front-end loaded bids); Ragazzo, supra note 25,
at 719-24 (discussing various forms of the two-tier tender offer); Gary P. Krelder,
Corporate Takeovers and the Business Judgment Rule: An Update, 11 J. CORP. L
633, 634-35 (1986) (defining a "tender offer"). See generally Theodore N. Mirvis, Two-
Tier Pricing: Some Appraisal and "Entire Fairness" Valuation Issues, 38 Bus. LAw.
485 (1983) (discussing fairness issues surrounding two-tier transactions); Mark G.
Strauch, Regulating Two-Tier Tender Offers: A Compromise Proposal With Negligible
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"front end," Mesa offered $54 cash per share for approximately 3796 of
Unocal's outstanding stock, enough to acquire 5090M The "back end,"
the portion reserved for those who were not in the first 5096 to tender,
gave stockholders highly subordinated securities, commonly known as
"junk bonds," with a purported value of $54 per share.'
After considerable deliberation, Unocal's board resolved to oppose
Mesa's offer as inadequate and instead to self-tender for its own stock as
a defensive measure.' The board decided that if Mesa got 5096 of the
shares in its tender offer for $54 per share, Unocal would offer to ex-
change debt securities worth $72 per share for the remaining 4996 of the
shares, specifically excluding Mesa from the list of offerees.3' Shortly
after Unocal commenced its self-tender, Mesa filed suit to restrain
Unocal from proceeding with the exchange.' The Vice Chancellor grant-
ed Mesa's request and issued a temporary restraining order, finding that
Unocal improperly excluded Mesa from the exchange offer.' The Del-
aware Supreme Court took the case to consider whether "the Unocal
board [had] the power and duty to oppose a takeover threat it reason-
ably perceived to be harmful to the corporate enterprise, and if so, is its
action here entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule?"'
The Delaware high court affirmed that the business judgment rule
applies in the context of a takeover, but found that when a board exer-
cises its power to forestall a takeover bid, the court must make two
threshold inquiries before applying the rule's presumption.' First, the
Disruption, 22 WnA rE L REv. 41, 45-46, 80 (1986) (defining two-tier front-end
loaded tender offers and offering a regulatory approach that only minimally controls
the tender offer market while still permitting the market to hold management respon-
sible and encouraging management to maintain efficiency by the threat of a hostile
takeover).
27. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 949-5N. Since the second tier of a two-tier tender offer consists of mar-
ket-dependent securities, determining the actual value of the second tier is often a
minute-by-minute proposition that constantly varies with the prevailing market price.
30. Id at 950-51.
31. Id at 951.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 952.
34. Id. at 953.
35. Id. at 954; Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984) (applying the busi-
ness judgment rule in a takeover context). The presumption of the business judgment
rule, stated in Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), is that the directors acted
.on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
1547
directors must show "that they had reasonable grounds for believing that
a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed."B In making this
determination, they "may not have acted solely or primarily out of a
desire to perpetuate themselves in office," but must have been "motivat-
ed by a good faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and its
stockholders," and their action must have been informed and taken with
due care.' Second, the defensive measure must have been "reasonable
in relation to the threat posed. "' With these two elements established,
the business judgment rule applies.'
The court held that the Unocal board had reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because
of the highly subordinated "junk bonds" that would be forced on stock-
holders who tendered in the second tier.' According to the court, pro-
tecting these stockholders as well as those who tendered in the front end
was an appropriate corporate purpose for the defensive self-tender.'
The self-tender was reasonable in relation to the threat posed because it
was specifically directed to those in the second tier, to protect them
from being squeezed out' in the back end of the merger and because
the threat was from a "corporate raider with a national reputation as a
was in the best interests of the company." Id at 812; see also AC Acquisitions Corp.
v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. CI 1986) (describing the defer-
ence the business judgment rule gives to the decisions of a corporation's board of
directors).
36. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id, at 958-59. Unocal has generated considerable commentary and has in-
spired discussions of its implications and applications to other scenarios, expecialy by
students. See generally Mark J. Bernet et al., Comment, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co.: The Selective Sef-Tender-Fighting Fire With Fire, 61 NOTRE DAME L REV.
109 (1986); Eric Grannis, Note, A Problem of Mixed Motives: Applying Unocal to
Defensive ESOPs, 92 COLum. L REV. 851 (1992); James F. Ritter, Comment, Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 72 VA. L REV. 851 (1986); David J. Schubert, Note,
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.: A New Era of Fiduciary Duty, 38 BAYOR L
REV. 687 (1986).
40. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956.
41. Id. at 955-56. The fact that the board was comprised of a majority of outside
directors strengthened this conclusion. Id. at 955.
42. A squeeze out, also known as a *freezeout," generally refers to a situation
where a majority forces a minority to accept cash or debt for its shares. See general-
ly IA MARTiN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZouTs § 9.01 (1994)
(defining and discussing freezeouts); Ronald L. Fein & William T. Drescher, Ofifers'
and Directors' Liability: A Review of The Business Judgment Rule: Leveraged Buy-
Out and Squeeze-Outs 1985, at 279 (PU Corp. L Practice Course Handbook Series
No. B4-6718, 1985) (discussing the history and application of the "entire fairness"
doctrine established in Weinberger as it applies to squeeze outs and leveraged buy-
outs).
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'greenmailer.'"' Therefore, the court held that the business judgment
rule applied to the board's decision and that Mesa failed to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the directors' decision was based pri-
marily on perpetuating themselves in office or on some other improper
purpose."
Thus, Unocal established that as long as its actions are reasonable and
primarily concerned with the welfare of shareholders, a board may insti-
tute defensive tactics to avoid a hostile takeover.' This ability to use
defensive tactics, though apparently broad in Unocal, was progressively
narrowed in a series of cases beginning with Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc.,' where the duty to auction was born.
43. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956. "Greenmail: The purchase of a substantial block of
target securities by an unfriendly suitor with the primary purpose of coercing the
target into repurchasing the block at a premium." LOSS & SEuGMAN, supra note 26, at
2140. Greenmail was a growing problem in the mid 1980s, but the Revenue Act of
1987 put a serious damper on the practice. See 26 U.S.C. § 5881(a) (1989 & Supp.
1994). The Act essentially created a 5096 excise tax on any gain realized as a result
of greenmail. Id. Section 5881(b) defines greenmail as:
[Amny consideration transferred by a corporation (or any person acting in
concert with such corporation) to directly or indirectly acquire stock of such
corporation from any shareholder if-
(1) such shareholder held such stock (as determined under section 1223) for
less than 2 years before entering into the agreement to make the transfer,
(2) at some time during the 2-year period ending on the date of such acqui-
sition-
(A) such shareholder,
(B) any person acting in concert with such shareholder, or
(C) any person who is related to such shareholder or person described
in subparagraph (B),
made or threatened to make a public tender offer for stock of such corpo
ration, and
(3) such acquisition is pursuant to an offer which was not made on the
same terms to all shareholders.
Id, § 5881(b). 26 U.S.C. § 5881 (b) (1989 & Supp. 1994).
The corporate raider with a reputation for greenmail to which the court referred
was T. Boone Pickens, Jr., President and Chairman of the Board of Mesa Petroleum
and the holding company that controlled the related entities. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949
n.1. For an amusing account of the antics of T. Boone Pickens and the time he got
caught in the unusual position of having to pay greenmail, see CONNIE BRUcK, THE
PREDATORS' BALL 164-66 (1989) (discussing the Phillips Petroleum deal and Carl Ichan
as the greenmailer).
44. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958-59.
45. Id. at 955.
46. 506 A.2d 173 (DeL 1986).
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B. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.
In Revlon, the court evaluated the legitimacy of defensive measures'7
instituted by the Revlon board to repel Pantry Pride's efforts to acquire
Revlon.' Discussions about a possible acquisition of Revlon began with
a series of meetings between Ronald 0. Perelman, chairman of the board
and chief executive officer of Pantry Pride, and Michael C. Bergerac,
chairman and chief executive officer of Revlon.' For several months,
Perelman made overtures to Bergerac to purchase Revlon in the $40 to
$50 per share range, but Bergerac consistently rebuffed the offers, claim-
ing that the price was inadequate.' Finally, Perelman received permis-
sion from the Pantry Pride board to either negotiate an acquisition of
Revlon for $42 to $43 per share or to make a hostile tender offer for $45
per share, and Perelman subsequently informed Bergerac of his inten-
tions."' When Bergerac informed Revlon's board of this impending take-
over attempt, the board quickly concluded that the prices discussed were
too low and began discussing defensive measures.'
The Revlon board adopted two defensive measures: a repurchase of up
to five million of its outstanding shares and execution of a Rights Plan,
or "poison pill" as it is commonly known, that would give shareholders
the right to exchange each share of common stock for a $65 Revlon note
at 1296 interest.' These measures stopped Pantry Pride's advances for
only four days, at which time Pantry Pride began making a series of all
cash offers to purchase shares of Revlon stock." When the board real-
47. Revlon instituted a lock-up option, a no-shop provision, and a $25 million ter-
mination fee. Generally, a "lock-up option' refers to any part of a transaction de-
signed to preclude, inhibit, or deter a competing bidder. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra
note 26, at 2146. Specifically, it refers to options to buy assets, unissued or treasury
shares, or even certain "crown jewel" divisions of the target that would make the
resulting transaction with the raider unattractive. Id.; see Jay M. Zitter, Annotation,
Lockup Option Defense to Hostile Corporate Takeover, 66 A.LL4th 180 (1988 &
Supp. 1994). For cases in which target companies used a lock-up option, see Watkins
v. Beatrice Cos., 560 A.2d 1016, 1018 (Del. 1989) (discussing a different Issue in the
KKR bid for Beatrice Companies Inc. in which an asset option played an integral
role); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Del. 1989); In re
Vitalink Communications Corp. Shareholders Litig., Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1 96,585
(DeL Ch. 1991); In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders iti, Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH)
1 94,181 (Del. Ch. 1988).
48. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 175.
49. Id, at 176.
50. Id
51. Id.
52. Id, at 176-77.
53. Id,
54. Id. Pantry Pride's first offer was an all-cash tender offer for any and all shares
at $47.50 for common shares and $26.67 for preferred, made on August 23. Id. at
177.
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ized that its defensive measures were not keeping Pantry Pride at bay, it
began looking for a white knight' and found one in the "Forstmann in-
vestment group." '
The board agreed to a leveraged buyout by Forstmann for $56 cash per
share. 7 As part of the deal, the board waived the provisions of the
Rights Plan' for the Forstmann transaction or "any other offer superior
to Forstmann's."' After announcement of the merger and dismantling of
the defensive rights in favor of Forstmann, the market for the notes fell
through.' Pantry Pride responded by raising its bid to $56.25 and in-
forming Revlon that it would continue raising its all-cash bids to beat any
other offer, so long as Revlon's board removed the effect of the Rights
Plan for them as well.6'
Thanks to certain confidential information provided exclusively to
Forstmann, the investment group soon returned with yet another offer,
for $57.25, with strings attached: Revlon must agree to a no-shop provi-
sion,' a lock-up option to purchase several key Revlon divisions,' and
a twenty-five million dollar cancellation fee if the transaction was not
consummated." If these conditions were met and the offer accepted
immediately, Forstmani would rescue the falling notes by exchanging
them with new ones.' The board accepted Forstmann's final offer, and
55. A "white night" is to an acquirer who is favorable to management and who is
willing to bid against a hostile raider. See Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 26, at 2132;
Gregory v. Anderson & Steven Augspurger, Defensive Tactics to Hostile Tender Of-
fers-An Examination of Their Legitimacy and Effectiveness, 11 J. CORP. L 651, 696
(1986) (discussing white night solicitation).
56. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177-78. This "investment group" was comprised of
Forstmann Little & Co., and an affiliated partnership. Id. at 175.
57. Id. at 178.
58. Id. Waiving the provisions of the Rights Plan involved waiving the covenants in
all outstanding notes, and redeeming the rights issued. Id.
59. Id, at 178.
60. Id.
61. Pantry Pride was able to offer all cash to Revlon's stockholders with the help
of Drexel Burnham Lambert and its legendary skill with "junk bonds." Id, at 179 n.7.
62. Id. at 178.
63. Id The lock-up option was to purchase Revlon's Vision Care and National
Health Laboratories divisions for $525 million. Id,




Pantry Pride sought injunctive relief from not only the Rights Plan, but
the lock-up, no-shop, and termination fee agreements as well.'
The Delaware Supreme Court held that although the board's imposi-
tion of the Rights Plan and self-tender were appropriate at early stages,'
they were improper after it "became apparent to all that the break-up of
the company was inevitable."' Once this point was reached, "[t]he duty
of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a
corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for
the stockholders' benefit. "' The directors became "auctioneers charged
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the compa-
ny."M°
The court found that when Revlon favored Forstmann and his offer
that would support the price of the notes, it ceased protecting the stock-
holders, and the directors breached their primary duty of loyalty.7 The
court did not, however, state that lock-ups, termination fees, or no-shop
provisions were impermissible per se, but rather that they become imper-
missible when they "end an active auction and foreclose further bid-
ding. " ' "[Wihen bidders make relatively similar offers, or dissolution of
the company becomes inevitable, the directors cannot fulfill their en-
hanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with the contending fac-
tions."' Commentary soon followed as directors scrambled to determine
the implications of this decision, specifically, when a break-up becomes
"inevitable."'
66. Id. at 179.
67. The court noted that the poison pill was removed for both parties when the
bids exceeded $57.25. Id. at 181. It also revealed its fixation on short-term profits by
noting that the Rights Plan caused the price to increase by at least $16 per share
and therefore accomplished the only legitimate purpose possible: increasing the short-
term cash shareholders would receive. See id
68. Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
69. Id
70. Id.
71. Id. The court noted that protecting the interests of the note holders was not a
permissible goal since their rights were fixed by contract See id. at 182-83 (citing
Wolfensohn v. Madison Fund, Inc., 253 A.2d 72, 75 (Del. Ch. 1969); Harff v.
Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. 1974)). Protecting the interests of note holders, or
other "non-stockholder interests," was a breach of the board's duties because the
court thought that such protection did not provide "rationally related benefits accru-
ing to stockholders." Id. at 182. This reasoning again falls to consider that supporting
the notes would inevitably affect the price of the stock and the perceived worth of
the company as a whole.
72. Id at 183.
73. Id, at 184.
74. See generally Judi G. Sorensen, Casenote and Comment, Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc.: Do Suitors of a Target Corporation Have a
"Right to Compete?" 25 IDAHo L REv. 441 (1989); David S. White, Auctioning the
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C. Carfication of Revlon Duties
1. City Capital Associates Limited Partnership v. Interco, Inc.
The next significant clarification of the decision came soon thereafter
in City Capital Associates Limited Partnership v. Interco, Inc.' In
Interco, Cardinal Acquisition Corporation, a subsidiary of City Capital
Associates Limited Partnership (CCA), made a series of all cash bids for
Interco'8 that were rejected by the Interco board." Specifically, the
board refused to redeem a Rights Plan and presented a reorganization
and restructuring plan to its stockholders as an alternative.' CCA even-
tually filed suit, requesting that the Chancellor enjoin management's pro-
ceeding with the restructuring plan, require redemption of the Rights
Plan, and prevent the selling of what CCA described as one of Interco's
crown jewels, Ethan Allen furniture."
The Chancellor analyzed the adoption and retention of the Rights Plan
under Unocal,' by first noting the caution with which it must approach
Corporate Bastion.. Delaware Readuts the Business Judgment Rule in Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 40 Sw. LJ. 1117 (1986). The debate contin-
ued for several years. See, e.g., Marcelle R. Joseph, Corporate Law I: When Is a
Company up for Sale? The Case Against Revlon Duties, 1990 ANN. Sutv. AM. L 273
(1991); Portia Policastro, Note, When Delaware Corporate Managers Turn Auction-
eers: Triggering the Revlon Duty After the Paramount Decision, 16 DEL J. CORP. L
187 (1991); Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers: Bridging the
Unocal/Revion Gap, 35 ARiz. L REV. 989 (1993); Ronald J. Rinaldi, Note, Radically
Altered States: Entering the "Revlon Zone," 90 COLUM. L REV. 760 (1990); Erica M.
Ryland, Note, Bracing for the "Failure Boom": Should a Revlon Auction Duty Arise
in Chapter 11?, 90 COLUM. L REV. 2255 (1990).
75. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
76. Id at 792-93. Interco Incorporated was a diversified holding company with 21
subsidiary corporations that were not interrelated. Id. at 791. With its combined 1988
fiscal sales of $3.34 billion and earnings of $3.50 per share, Interco became a prime
candidate for a "bust-up" takeover. Id.; see also Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 26, at
2132-33. ("'Bust-up takeover': A takeover that will result in the sale of substantial
assets of the target Often the term is used pejoratively as in the assertion of a lead-
ing practitioner that 'we have entered the era of the two-tier, front-end loaded, boot-
strap, bust-up, junk-bond takeover.'" (quoting Martin Upton, Takeover Abuses Mortgage
the Future, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1985, at A16)).
77. Interco, 551 A.2d at 792-94. From July 27, 1988 to October 18, 1988, CCA
raised its bid at least four times, from $64 per share to $74 per share. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id
80. I& at 796. Before beginning this analysis, while stating the facts that would
provide the basis for the court's reasoning, the court noted a fact that becomes a
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the task to avoid interjecting its own business judgment when unneces-
sary.8 When analyzing the first element of Unocal, the Chancellor identi-
fied two categories of threat to corporate policy and effectiveness, both
centered on protecting shareholder interest when the transaction in ques-
tion was for all shares.'
The first type of threat, titled a "threat to voluntariness," was defined
as occurring when the structure of a tender offer would have a "coercive
effect on a rational shareholder"' such that it would interfere with the
shareholder "exercising choice to remain a stockholder in the firm."' In
this case, however, the court categorized the threat under its second
classification: a substantive threat to shareholders' economic interests.8'
This kind of threat arises when the amount of consideration being of-
fered is inadequate in the eyes of the board. ' In these cases, removal of
the decision to accept or reject the offer by institution or retention of
defensive measures is not proper, but this does not necessarily mean that
all defensive measures must come down immediately.' Measures that
function to increase the value that will devolve upon stockholders at the
end of the day may, and should, remain effective until they either hinder
the process or are no longer needed. '
Continued validity of the poison pill was therefore contingent on its
effectiveness as a tool for advancing shareholder interests either as a
negotiating tool to permit the corporation to fulfill its role as auctioneer,
crucial point to revisit when dissecting Paramount v. QVC. The court noted that "[a]
reasonable shareholder could prefer the restructuring to the sale of his stock for $74
in cash now, but a reasonable shareholder could prefer the reverse." Id. The court
stated this even after noting that the restructuring was ostensibly worth two dollars
per share more than the cash bid, though this amount was "inherently a debatable
proposition." Id at 795. For these statements to be consistent, price could not have
been the final arbiter. See id
81. Id. at 796. "The danger that it poses is, of course, that courts-in exercising
some element of substantive judgment-will too readily seek to assert the primacy of
their own view on a question upon which reasonable, completely disinterested minds
might differ." Id.
82. Id, at 797. It is interesting to note the similarity between these observations by
the Chancellor and the broad definition of an auction in Paramount. Compare id, at
797 with Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del. 1994).
83. Interco, 551 A.2d at 797.
84. Id. As an example of a structurally coercive offer, the court pointed to the all-
too-common two-tier front-end loaded tender offer. Id.; see supra note 26 (defining a
front-end loaded two-tier tender offer). The court also identified a "structurally non
coercive offer that contained false or misleading material information" as falling with-
in this category. Interco, 551 A.2d at 797 n.10.
85. Id. at 798.
86. Id. at 797
87. See id
88. 1& at 797-98.
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or some other non-self-interested goal.' Although in some rare cases it
may be proper for a board to deny shareholders the option of accepting
an offer by retaining a poison pill, this was not such a case.' There was
no great threat posed by the CCA bid over the repurchase agreement
because the values were so close, and indeed, the CCA bid may have
been worth more after taking into account the contingencies in the mar-
ket.9'
2. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.
The next significant case to address this Revlon duty to auction was
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.' In Mills, the management of
Macmillan, a large publishing, educational, and informational services
company, recognized that Macmillan was a likely target of an unsolicited
takeover bid.' To avoid a hostile takeover, various defensive tactics
were instituted,' and in the course of a lengthy battle for control be-
tween as many as six possible suitors that included a partial break-up of
the company, two bidders emerged as serious contenders' - a group
of companies owned by Robert Maxwell, and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts &
Co. (KKR)."
As the bidding process proceeded, management gave KKR many highly
questionable, and some clearly impermissible, advantages.' Through
89. Id. at 798.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 799-800. The court's final discussion focused on whether a sale of the
Ethan Allan subsidiary could be enjoined as an improper defensive measure. Id. The
court concluded that so long as the board acted in good faith to achieve a fair price
for the subsidiary, there would be no net loss to the shareholders, and therefore the
action was reasonable, even in response to the minimal threat imposed by the CCA
bid. Id. at 800-01.
92. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
93. Id. at 1265.
94. Id at 1265-66. The techniques used in this case included a major corporate re-
structuring that vested absolute majority control of the restructured company in the
hands of top level management Id, at 1265. These individuals also took control of an
employee stock option plan (ESOP), id., and subsequently adopted a Rights Plan,
commonly known as a "poison pill," to which the ESOP was exempt ld. at 1265-6&
Several lucrative severance contracts, known as "golden parachute" agreements, were
also instituted for several top executives in the event of a hostile takeover. Id,
95. Id. at 1272 & n.17, 1274.
96. Id. at 1272.
97. Id at 1272-74. A partial list of these indiscretions is noted here for perspec-
tive. Macmillan management provided confidential financial information to KKR and
1555
bidding "tips" and disclosure of other internal, nonpublic financial infor-
mation, KKR finally achieved the highest bid and the board's recommen-
dation, despite Maxwell's repeated emphasis that he was willing to ex-
ceed any other bid with an unqualified cash offer." Maxwell sued, seek-
ing to enoin the lockup agreement, termination fees, and the payment of
expenses that Macmillan had granted to KKR.'
The Delaware Supreme Court held that there was no justification for
the Macmillan board's continuing hostility toward Maxwell after the
board had decided to sell the entire company and abandon any further
restructuring attempts.'O The court stated that "[f]urther discriminatory
treatment of a bidder, without any rational benefit to the shareholders,
was unwarranted."'' The proper objective was to obtain the highest
price reasonably available for the company, "provided it was offered by a
reputable and responsible bidder."" There was clear impropriety on the
part of certain board members who had a personal financial stake in the
outcome," fraud was perpetrated upon the board by them,"° and the
board virtually abandoned its oversight functions."l
In discussing the scope of the board's responsibilities, the court clearly
noted that there was an active bidding process in progress, and the
board's role as auctioneer had been invoked under Revlon."0' "At a mini-
mum, Revlon requires that there be the most scrupulous adherence to
repeatedly denied Maxwell the same information. Id, at 1272, 1274 n.20. Management
set a deadline for bids, and told Maxwell of the deadline the day before, giving him
less than 24 hours before to prepare a bid after giving KKR a week; they then ne-
gotiated with KKR all night after the deadline to exceed Maxwell's bid. Id. at 1273-
74. In another round of bidding, Macmillan's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
Edward P. Evans telephoned a representative of KKR and "tipped" Maxwell's bid,
disclosing that the bids were considered "a little close." Id. at 1275. Finally,
Macmillan led Maxwell to believe that he had made the highest offer when KKR had
actually topped his all cash offer with a mixed offer of cash and securities, causing
Maxwell to miss the opportunity to make good on his promise to beat any other
offer. Id.
98. Id. at 1274-75.
99. Id. at 1278.
100. Id at 1282. The court was careful to note in its analysis that this case did not
involve the question of whether Revlon duties devolved at all Instead, the issue was
the scope of board's duty once an auction had begun and Revlon duties applied. Id.
at 1285. "What we are required to determine here is the scope of the board's respon-
sibility in an active bidding contest once their role as auctioneer has been invoked
under Revlon. Particularly, we are concerned with the use of lockup and no-shop
clauses." Id.
101. Id, at 1282.
102. Id.
103. Id, at 1282-83.
104. Id. at 1283-84.
105. Id. at 1281-82.
106. Id. at 1285.
1556
[Vol. 22: 1541, 19951 Delaware's Duty to Auction
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
ordinary principles of fairness in the sense that stockholder interests are
enhanced, rather than diminished, in the conduct of an auction for the
sale of corporate control." " Repeatedly emphasizing that the directors'
sole responsibility is to act for the shareholders' benefit, the court found
that defensive tactics are only permissible if they substantially or materi-
ally enhance general stockholder interests."
3. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.
The next case to discuss a possible duty to auction was Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. (Time-Warner)." In Time-
Warner, Paramount Communications, Inc., and shareholders of Time,
Inc., sued to enjoin the merger of Time and Warner, Inc."' Time and
Warner had negotiated a merger whereby Warner's shareholders, mostly
independent parties purchasing stock on the market, would exchange
their shares for Time stock, and the new board and management would
reflect an equitable combination of both companies."' Just after Time
sent out detailed proxy statements concerning the approval vote on the
merger to the stockholders, Paramount announced an all-cash offer to
purchase all outstanding Time shares for well over Time's current trading
price."2 Time responded by abandoning the previous merger agreement
with Warner and making an immediate all-cash offer for 51% of Warner's
outstanding stock, financed by seven to ten billion dollars of debt."'
Time continued to reject Paramount's advances and increasing bids.
107. Id.
108. l The court made statements emphasizing the importance of acting for the
shareholders' benefit in the context of three different discussions: the board's duties
in conducting the auction, icL, the permissibility of the lockup option, id at 1285-86,
and the use of a no-shop clause. ld. at 1286. In this case, Macmillan granted KKR
what is known as a "crown jewel" lockup, a right to purchase the company's most
valued assets, and the court noted that serious questions as to its propriety were
raised when there was little or no improvement in the final bid as a result of the
lockup. Id The court found the no-shop clause was even more limited in its appro-
priate usage, and "[aibsent a material advantage to the stockholders from the terms
or structure of a bid that is contingent on a no-shop clause, a successful bidder
imposing such a condition must be prepared to survive the careful scrutiny which
that concession demanda&" Id,
109. 571 A.2d 1140 (DeL 1990).
110. Id. at 1141-42.
111. Id. at 1145-46.
112. Id at 1147.
113. Id at 1148.
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Paramount ultimately filed suit to enjoin Time's acquisition of Warner," '
and Paramount's suit was consolidated with a suit brought by Time's
shareholders seeking the same injunction."5
The shareholder plaintiffs alleged that when Time agreed to merge
with Warner, Time was put up for sale, triggering Revlon duties that
required Time's board to treat Paramount's bid and Warner's merger on
equal footing. " Further, the Time plaintiffs alleged that Time's board
failed to seek a control premium for its stockholders and thereby
breached its duties, failing to maximize short-term value for shareholders
as required by Revlon."' Paramount alleged that the Chancellor im-
properly applied the first prong of the Unocal test because Time's board
could not have reasonably believed that Paramount's bid was a "threat to
Time's shareholders and a danger to Time's corporate policy and effec-
tiveness.""8 The second prong, Paramount alleged, was also improperly
decided because when Time's board denied stockholders the chance to
consider or respond to Paramount's offer, it did so to perpetuate itself in
office and not as a reasonable response in relation to the Paramount
threat."
The court chose not to frame the issue in terms of when a corporation
must abandon its long term plans to maximize short-term shareholder
value,"n but in terms of when Revlon duties attach. Specifically, "[d]id
Time, by entering into the proposed merger with Warner, put itself up for
sale?" '2 The court refused to base its decision on a "change of control"
as the Chancellor had done. Instead, it concluded that Time did not
make "the dissolution or break-up of the corporate entity inevitable," and
therefore Revlon duties were inapplicable and the board was not under a
duty to maximize short-term profits.'22 The court reasoned that
"generally speaking and without excluding other possibilities, " "2 two
circumstances trigger Revlon duties: (1) "when a corporation initiates an
active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorga-
nization involving a clear break-up of the company,"" and (2) when "in
114. Id. at 1149.
115. Id at 114142.
116. Id, at 1149.
117. Id.
118. Id. This was especially true since, under the stated terms of the merger,
Warner shareholders would end up with approximately 6296 of the resulting
companys stock, so the company would be sold in either case. Id,
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1150.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. This language becomes a key plank in the court's reasoning in Paramount
v. QVC.
124. Id. (citing Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (DeL 1988).
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response to a bidder's offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and
seeks an alternative transaction involving the breakup of the compa-
ny. "125 It distinguished these two situations from the situation in which
"the board's reaction to a hostile tender offer is found to constitute only
a defensive response and not an abandonment of the corporation's con-
tinued existence," to which Revlon duties do not attach."
The court rejected Paramount's argument that either the board's sub-
jective intent or the adoption of defensive measures resulted in a change
of control, stating that Revlon does not apply to "corporate transactions
simply because they might be construed as putting a corporation either
'in play' or 'up for sale.'"1 21 Further, the court also found that recasting
the merger as a purchase rather than a stock for stock exchange did not
evidence Time's abandonment of its strategic plan or make a sale inevi-
table." Therefore, Time's board was not under a duty to maximize
short-term shareholder value as required by Revlon, but was free to pur-
sue a strategic plan driven by long-range goals.
With Revlon carefully tucked away, the Time board's decisions were
entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule." Because the
board adopted defensive measures, a Unocal analysis was required be-
fore the business judgment rule could attach.' The first step in- this
analysis was to determine if there was a threat to Time's corporate poli-
cy and effectiveness. 3' In this regard, Paramount adopted as its argu-
ment the bipartite structure of Interco" for determining when there is
a threat. Paramount concluded that because its offer was all cash for all
This language appears verbatim in the text because although its meaning may have
been clear to the court at the time, its interpretation in Paramount v. QVC showed
that these simple words were almost universally misunderstood. See Paramount v.
QVC, 637 A.2d 34, 47 (DeL 1994).
125. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1150. It was the second scenario that the court used
to describe the actual events in Revlon. Id.
126. Id
127. Id. at 1151. In this language, the court declined to do exactly what it did in
Paramount v. QVC when it conditioned the existence of Revlon duties on a change
in control. See Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45-46.
128. Time Warner, 571 A.2d at 1150.
129. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (discussing the presumptions of
the business judgment rule). The decision to expand Time's business through a strate-
gic merger with Warner was evaluated under this standard and found to be reason-
able. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1151-52.
130. Time Warner, 571 A.2d at 1150.
131. Id at 1152.
132. See supra note 77-82 and accompanying text.
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shares and fell "within a range of values a shareholder could reasonably
prefer,"" no threat arose from the offer.'
The court disagreed, and in the process rejected the two part struc-
turela for analyzing the first element of the Unocal test used by the
Chancellor in Interco." The court considered the "inadequacy of the
price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the
impact of 'constituencies' other than shareholders... the risk of noncon-
summation, and the quality of securities being offered in the ex-
change " " and found that three of Time's concerns supported a -finding
that Paramount's offer was a threat."
The court then considered whether the restructuring of the Time-
Warner transaction from a stock for stock merger to an outright pur-
chase was a reasonable response to the threat posed by the Paramount
all cash bid.1' Paramount argued that Time's response was unreason-
able because it deprived the shareholders of the control premium they
would receive under Paramount's higher offer.'" Again the court was
unpersuaded, finding that because the board's actions were not coercive
in nature, were aimed at the "carrying forward of a pre-existing
transaction in altered form," and did not preclude Paramount from bid-
ding on the combined Time-Warner entity or making its offer more at-
tractive, the response was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. 4'
The court reasoned that "[d]irectors are not obliged to abandon a delib-
erately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit un-
less there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.""°
133. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1152. The fact that Paramount's offer was all-cash
for all of Warner's stock is significant because it removes the coerciveness of the
typical two-tier tender offer, which was present in Unoca. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1984).
134. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1152.
135. Id. at 1153; see supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text; BNS, Inc. v.
Koppers, 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988).
136. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1153. The court specifically disapproved of the "nar-
row and rigid construction of Unocal," used by the Chancellor, and opted for an
.open-ended analysis . . . not intended to lead to a simple mathematical approach."
Id.
137. Id, (citing Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)).
138. Id. These three concerns were: (1) the risk that "Time shareholders might
tender into Paramount's cash offer in ignorance," without a complete understanding
of the benefits of the Warner transaction; (2) that the bid would introduce uncertain-
ty that would skew the comparative analysis; and (3) that the timing of the offer was
intended to confuse. Id. These three facts sufficiently showed that there was a threat
to corporate policy. Id
139. Id at 1154.
140. Id.
141. AL at 1154-55.
142. Id. at 1154. These words would come back to haunt the court in Paramount
1560
[Vol. 22: 1541, 1995] Delaware's Duty to Auction
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Many believed after Time-Warner that the court had clarified its
stance on when Revlon duties attach, fixing that time at when a
corporation's breakup becomes inevitable."e This, however, proved not
to be the case.
HI. PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. QVC NEWORK, INC.'"
A. Facts
In the late 1980s, Paramount began investigating candidates in the
entertainment, media, and communications industry for a possible merg-
er or acquisition.5 In the rapidly evolving field of entertainment and
communications, Paramount saw such a merger or acquisition "as desir-
able, and perhaps necessary, to keep pace with competitors."' Cau-
tious, however, about selecting an appropriate merger candidate, the
board adopted a "poison pill" Rights Agreement to make Paramount
unattractive to any hostile takeover attempts."' The Paramount board
made its first attempt at strategic expansion through an effort to acquire
Time, Inc., but was ultimately unsucessful.'
As early as 1990, Paramount had fixed its sights on Viacom as another
possible merger candidate.' The most recent round of negotiations be-
tween the two companies began at a dinner meeting on April 20, 1993,
between Martin S. Davis, Paramount's chairman and chief executive of-
ficer, and Sumner M. Redstone, chairman, chief executive officer, and
controlling stockholder of Viacom," and by July serious negotiations
were underway.5 The proposed merger would make Davis the chief
executive officer of the new company, with Redstone remaining the con-
v. QVC when they were "misinterpreted" by the parties in that case. See Paramount
v. QVC, 637 A.2d 34, 46-47 (Del. 1994).
143. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1150; see also Policastro, supra note 74 (discussing
the implications of Time-Warner on the duty to auction); Gentile, supra note 10, at
903 & n.58 (noting that many commentators, through Time-Warner, limited the appli-
cation of Revlon duties to circumstances involving a break-up).
144. 637 A.2d 34 (DeL 1994).
145. Id. at 38.
146. lId
147. Id, at 39.
148. Id, at 38; see supra notes 109-43 and accompanying text; Time-Warner, 571
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).




trolling stockholder, but the negotiations broke down when the parties
could not agree on the price or terms of a stock option Viacom demand-
ed." Redstone offered a package of cash and stock with a market val-
ue of approximately $61 per share, but Davis wanted at least $70 per
share.15
Shortly after negotiations with Viacom broke down, Davis learned of
QVC's potential interest in Paramount." Davis told Barry Diller, chair-
man, chief executive officer, and a substantial stockholder of QVC, that
Paramount was not for sale."
Discussions between Paramount and Viacom resumed in August and
early September, and resulted in a proposed transaction." The Para-
mount Board unanimously approved the Original Merger Agreement on
September 12, 1993 whereby Paramount would merge with and into
Viacom by means of a two-tier offer consisting of a combination of cash
and stock that was front-end loaded and highly coercive.67 Central to
the negotiations were several defensive measures insisted upon by
Viacom, including a "No-Shop" provision, a Termination Fee, and a Stock
Option Agreement."
152. Id. The stock option eventually agreed upon was one of the defensive mea-
sures invalidated by the court. See id. at 50.
153. Id.
154. Id
155. Id. It is interesting to note that Diller and Davis were not entirely unac-
quainted with each other. DUller, now with QVC, had served as chief executive officer
of Paramount Pictures Corporation, the motion picture studio subsidiary of Gulf &
Western Inc. Mr. Diller left Paramount Pictures in 1984, one year after Mr. Davis be-
came chairman and chief executive officer of Gulf & Western, which was later re-
named Paramount Communications, Inc. Diller went on to serve as chairman and
chief executive officer of Fox, Inc., for 12 years before joining QVC in January of
1993. See QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1248
n.4 (Del. Ch. 1993), affd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) [hereinafter Chancery Opinion].
This was actually a strange kind of homecoming.
156. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 39.
157. Id. The offer was for 51% cash and a "back-end" of various securities. Id. In a
two-tier front-end loaded tender offer, shareholders are typically coerced into partici-
pating in the merger quickly so as to receive cash in the front-end and avoid being
left with the often questionable securities in the back-end. See supra note 26 (defin-
ing a two-tier front-end loaded offer).
158. Chancery Opinion, 635 A.2d at 1249-50; Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 49.
The termination fee actually began at $150 million but was negotiated down to $100
million. Chancery Opinion, 635 A.2d at 1250. The stock option permitted Viacom to
purchase 19.996 of Paramount's stock at $69 per share. Id at 1251; Paramount v.
QVC, 637 A.2d at 39. In itself, this was not so unusual, but the other two features
added to the strength of this defensive measure. The Stock Option Agreement also
contained a "Note Feature" and a "Put Feature." Id. The "Note Feature" freed Viacom
from coming up with any cash, permitting it to exercise the option with a senior
subordinated note. Id. The "Put Feature" permitted Viacom to simply ask for the
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On September 20, 1993, Diller sent a letter to Davis proposing a merger
by which QVC would acquire Paramount for approximately $80 per share
in a two-tier, front-end loaded, highly coercive combination of cash and
securities." After numerous delays, and in light of the potent defensive
tactics in the Original Merger Agreement, QVC filed an action to enjoin
enforcement of the defensive measures"® and publicly announced an
$80 cash tender offer on October 21, 1993."6 In a lengthy opinion, the
court of chancery preliminarily enjoined Paramount from taking any
action to facilitate the consummation of the Paramount-Viacom Original
Merger Agreement, amending its poison pill Rights Agreement, or exer-
cising any portion of the Stock Option Agreement."
B. Analysis Under Existing Precedent
The Delaware Supreme Court began its analysis with the business
judgment rule, acknowledging the importance of trusting the board of
directors with managerial decisionmaking. " It noted, however, that en-
difference between the $69 option price and the current market price if it chose not
to exercise the option. Id. This provision also appears reasonable on its face, but
because there was no cap on how much 'he "Put Feature" could be worth, when the
price of the stock rose to well over $100 per share the value of the "Put Feature"
became unreasonable. Id.
159. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 39.
160. Id. at 40. The initial question in this case was whether the Chancery Court
should have enjoined the imposition of the defensive measures in the Original Merger
Agreement between Paramount and Viacom. Id. at 36-37. In Delaware, an injunction
is proper if the plaintiff demonstrates a reasonable probability of success on the
merits, that some irreparable harm will occur without the irjunction, and that the
balance of equities or hardships favors the grant of injunctive relief. Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986). There is no doubt
that QVC would have suffered irreparable harm if defensive measures remained in
place because Paramount and Viacom would have completed their merger by the
time a court rendered a final decision. Thus, the question becomes whether QVC had
a reasonable probability of success on the merits. Success on the merits will often
depend on what level of scrutiny the court applies, and what the test that level of
scrutiny requires. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103,
111 (Del. 1986) ("Because the effect of the proper invocation of the business judg-
ment rule is so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determi-
nation of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is determinative of
the outcome of derivative litigation."). Where the business judgment rule applies,
courts will give deference to the decisions of the directors and will presume their
good faith. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180.
161. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 40.
162. Chancery Opinion, 635 A.2d at 1245.
163. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 4142. As in its general application, the burden
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hanced scrutiny is proper under certain circumstances. '" Two aspects
to rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule lies squarely on the plaintiff.
See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text; Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 25,
at 1404 & n.16 (citing Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980)).
164. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 42. The court listed five cases in which en-
hanced scrutiny has been applied. Of these five cases, three have been previously
discussed in this article. For Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (DeL
1984), see supra part II.A; Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), see supra part II.B; and Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,
559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989), see supra part II.C.2. The court also listed Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985), and Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d
1131 (Del. 1990).
In Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court analyzed the validity of the Poison Pill
Rights Plan for the first time. The board of Household International, Inc. had adopted
a Rights Plan giving stockholders a Right if either an offer was made for at least
30% of Household's outstanding shares or if-a single entity or group acquired 20% of
the company's shares. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1348-49. Once a shareholder received a
Right, it could be exercised either to purchase 1/100 of a share of preferred House-
hold stock for $100 or to purchase $200 worth of the stock of the tender offeror for
$100. Id, at 1349 (this is commonly known as a flip-over poison pill provision).
The court analyzed the validity of the poison pill on two levels, first inquiring
whether the board had the power to adopt this type of measure at all under Dela-
ware Corporate Law, id. at 1351-55, and if so, whether it breached its fiduciary du-
ties by doing so in this case. Id. at 1355-57. As to the first question, the court read
the controlling statutes broadly and found that the Household Board was justified in
both issuing the rights, and in purchasing the shares of the tender offeror as a form
of "Anti-destruction" clause, even though their true purpose was to deter a coercive
two-tier tender offer. Id, at 1351-52; see DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (1994) (authoriz-
ing a corporation to create and issue securities, rights or options); DEL CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 151(g) (1994) (permitting the board to issue stock by resolution without
stockholder approval); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1994). The requirement that an
offeror comply with certain notice requirements, also was not inconsistent with the
use of a poison pill in this case. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1352 n.9, 1353; see DEL CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1994). As if this was not enough justification for its decision, the
court also noted that the Household Board was authorized to enact the Rights Plan
under the section that gives them the power to manage the corporation's "business
and affairs." See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1994); Moran, 500 A.2d at 1353
n.11. The Board also did not usurp the shareholder's ability to receive hostile bids
because there were several ways for a hostile bidder to avoid the provisions of the
poison pill. Id, at 1353-54 (listing the options of a hostile bidder as (1) "tendering
with a condition that the Board redeem the rights, (2) tendering with a high mini-
mum condition of shares and Rights, (3) tendering and soliciting consents to remove
the Board and redeem the Rights, (4) to acquiring 50% of the shares and causing
Household to self-tender for the rights," or (5) forming a group and acquiring 19.9%
of the stock and soliciting proxies "to remove the Board and redeem the Rights"). In
its final discussion of this point, the court also pointed out that, although the struc-
ture of the poison pill made it difficult for a potential purchaser to wage a proxy
contest, the voting power of the individual shares did not diminish. Id. at 1355. The
court concluded that the Chancellor's decision that the effect on proxies would be
minimal was supported by sufficient evidence and the proxy rules were not an inhibi-
tion on the stockholders' rights. Id.
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of this case required application of enhanced scrutiny: it involved a
change of control, thereby bringing the board under enhanced Revlon du-
ties," and defensive measures requiring analysis under the Unocal
test.'6T These two tests are common enough, and it is not the court's
application of these tests that makes this case noteworthy. Rather, it is
the court's choice of which test to apply under these circumstances that
is significant. Therefore, any critical analysis of this opinion must em-
brace the goals that motivated the court to choose its test, and then
evaluate how well that test furthered those ends. The crux of this case,
and the place to begin, is the reasoning used to conclude that
Paramount's Revlon duties had arisen. The court stated that its primary
reason for applying Revlon duties was that a "change of control" had
taken place."7
On the second issue, more relevant in hindsight, the court discussed whether the
board of directors was entitled to the presumption of the business judgment rule
when adopting a poison pill. Id. at 1355-56. After noting that there was no contention
that the directors acted in bad faith or to entrench themselves in office, the court
applied the two prong test set forth in Unocal to determine whether the business
judgment rule attached. Id. at 1356. As to the first prong, the court found that
Household's adoption of the Rights Plan was in response to "what it perceived to be
the threat in the market place of coercive two-tier tender offers." Id. The court then
dismissed Moran's contention that the Household Board was not entitled to the pre-
sumption of the business judgment rule because it did not make an informed deci-
sion by noting that a plaintiff must show gross negligence when attacking the busi-
ness judgment of the directors, Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), and
that this could not be shown when the directors received information on the essen-
tials of the plan, and a summary of relevant takeover law, and they engaged in "ex-
tended discussion" with knowledgeable counsel Moran, 500 F.2d at 1356. As to the
second prong of Unocal, the court quickly concluded that given the board's research,
and the fact that an insider was the aggressor, it was reasonable for the board to
adopt a poison pill as a defense. Id. at 1357. Therefore, the adoption of the poison
pill was in all respects appropriate, and a new precedent was set
165. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 42; see supra note 69-70 and accompanying
text (discussing Revlon duties).
166. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 42; see supra notes 35-39 and accompanying
text (discussing the Unocal test). The court distinguished these two types of scrutiny
from the more exacting standard applied where actual self-interest is present and
affects a majority of the directors approving a transaction. Paramount v. QVC, 637
A.2d at 42 n.9. In such a case, a court will determine whether the transaction is "en-
tirely fair to the stockholders." Id.; see infra notes 284-88 and accompanying text
(applying the Weinberger entire fairness test).
167. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 51.
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1. Change of Control-Implication of Revlon Duties
Existing precedent dictated two scenarios that give rise to a board's
duty as auctioneer. "[W]hen a corporation initiates an active bidding
process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization in-
volving a clear break-up of the company" or "where, in response to a
bidder's offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an al-
ternative transaction involving the breakup of the company.""s In this
case, however, neither of these scenarios existed. Paramount had not
initiated a bidding process but rejected QVC's bids at every turn.'
Paramount's board also had not abandoned its long-term strategy, but
rather first considered a combination with Viacom because of its "strate-
gic fit."'"m Therefore, if the Revlon duty to maximize shareholder profit
were to arise, it must devolve from another source.' This source was
dicta from Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.m and Barkan v.
Amsted Industries, Inc."
Ironically, the court previously spoke only once of these two cases in
close proximity to each other, and without reference to this usage.'"
The language in Barkanm is more prone to the reading the court gave
it in Paramount v. QVC, but neither case had been previously under-
stood to stand for the proposition that any change of control required
the board to maximize shareholder value.'" When the language the
168. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (1990).
169. See Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 37-41.
170. See id. at 38-39; Chancery Opinion, 635 A.2d 1245, 1248, 1269-70 (Del. Ch.
1993), ofd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
171. In the sense that a the duty to maximize short-term profit had to come from
somewhere, it comes from the cases noted in the text However, the court clearly
stated that the true reason for the rule in this case was Its desire to protect minority
shareholder interests. See Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 42.
172. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); see supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
173. 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989).
174. The one case where the Delaware Supreme Court cited both Mills and Barkan
for the same proposition was in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 368
& n.36 (DeL 1993) (generally referring to the business judgment rule in the context
of a merger or sale).
175. The phrase the court extracted reads as follows: "We believe that the general
principles announced in Revlon, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., Del.Supr.,
493 A.2d 946 (1985), and in Moran v. Household International, Inc., Del.Supr., 500
A.2d 1346 (1985) govern this case and every case in which a fundamental change of
corporate control occurs or is contemplated." Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 46
(quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del, 1989)).
176. On the contrary, the Court of Chancery opinions following Mills and Barkan
note that there is "no single blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its duties"
even in change of control situations. Roberts v. General Inst. Corp., Fed. Sec. L Rep.
95,465, 16 DEL. J. CoRP. L 1540 (DeL CI 1990); Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc.
Indus., Inc., Fed. Sec. L Rep. 95,617, 16 DEL. J. CoRP. L 1462 (Del. Ch. 1990)
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court extracted from Barkan is put back into its original context, the
court's deconstructionalism becomes potently evident.
In Barkan, the court stated that the principles of Revlon govern in
every case in which a "fundamental change of corporate control occurs
or is contemplated," but explicitly noted that the general principles of
Revlon, Unocal, and Moran v. Household Int'l Inc. control: "[Tlhe basic
teaching of these precedents is simply that the directors must act in ac-
cordance with their fundamental duties of care and loyalty."'" The
court went on to emphasize that
a court evaluating the propriety of a change of control or a takeover defense must
be mindful of "the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders." Never-
theless, there is no single blueprint that a board must follow to fWfill its du-
ties .... Rather, a board's actions must be evaluated in light of relevant circum-
stances to determine if they were undertaken with due diligence and in good
faith. If no breach of duty is found, the board's actions are entitled to the
protections of the business judgment rule.'"
The court in Barkan was not concerned with creating a duty to auction
or establishing a new trigger after which a board must maximize short-
term share value; it was trying to do exactly the opposite. There is no
need to paraphrase the court's intentions when the actual language of
Barkan is forthright:
Revlon does not demand that every change in the control of a Delaware corpora-
tion be preceded by a heated bidding contest Revlon is merely one of an unbro-
ken line of cases that seek to prevent the conflicts of interest that arise in the
field of mergers and acquisitions by demanding that directors act with scrupulous
concern for fairness to shareholders.'"7
It is clear from this statement that Barkan cannot realistically be con-
strued as creating a duty to auction to maximize short-term value when-
ever there is a change of control, as the court concludes in Paramount
v. QVC.'" The language in Mills is similarly clear in stating that al-
though the court applied a duty to maximize short-term value, the court's
(specifically noting that the board was not under a duty to auction the company
even when the transaction involves the sale of the enterprise); see also In re Vitalink
Communications Corp. Shareholders Litig., Fed. Sec. L Rep. 96, 585, 17 DEL J.
CORP. L. 1311, 1324-25 (Del. Ch. 1991) (noting the enhanced scrutiny required in
change of control situations but using a "reasonableness in the circumstances" test to
determine what is in the stockholders' best interests).
177. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286.
178. Id. at 1286 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. Paramount v. QVC, 637 K2d 34, 43-44 (Del. 1994).
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primary concern was to scrupulously advance shareholder "fairness."'
Mills also involved what the target board acknowledged was a clear auc-
tion for the company wherein both bidders planned to divide the com-
pany if they prevailed." There was little question that Revlon duties ap-
plied. So why did the court extrapolate from the dissimilar facts of Mills
a duty to auction for Paramount? The court's intention and underlying
principal has remained the same, and it is as noble now as it was then
to ensure that shareholder interests are protected.
The extensive preliminary discussion of the court's commitment to
protect the voting rights of shareholders shows that protecting share-
holder rights was the reason the court expanded the language in Barkan
and Mills to create a more broadly applicable duty to auction." The
court asserted that minority shareholders suffer a "significant diminu-
tion" in voting power when a single person or group acquires a control-
ling share." For such a sacrifice, shareholders should receive a
"control premium," testifying to the value of a controlling block of
shares. "
The court was concerned with protecting the interests of the stock-
holders once control passed to Redstone and his Viacom empire." Be-
fore the Paramount-Viacom merger, a "fluid aggregation of unaffiliated
181. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Del. 1989).
182. Id. at 1266.
183. See Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 42-43.
184. Id. at 42. This focus on the diminution of voting rights of majority stockhold-
ers when they become a minority implies that their vote is being stolen or otherwise
rendered ineffectual. This is hardly the case since their vote will be by tender and
stockholders are frequently paid handsomely for their support. If a majority does not
tender, they have rejected the offer, just as if they had so told the board at the last
shareholder's meeting. The most ironic part of this case is that, notwithstanding Its
being couched in language of protecting shareholders, the court is actually trying to
protect a willing majority from itself and the consequences of its own actions.
185. Id at 43. It is interesting to note that the court would have applied an even
more exacting scrutiny if there had been any actual fraud, director self-interest, or a
majority "freezeout" of the minority. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983) (testing to see if a transaction involving a cash-out merger was made as
a result of director self-dealing). The court, however, would have had no problem if
this had been a "going private" acquisition whereby the raider left shareholders with
no position at all in the target. See LPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 42, § 9.01. It
is ironic that the court requires the board to achieve a bigger control premium when
the shareholders have the opportunity to keep a minority position, as compared to a
simple purchase transaction where the minority, who may not have agreed or who
voted against the merger but lost, will receive no position at all. In those cases, a
simple majority vote is sufficient to satisfy the court that the transaction was equita-
ble to all. Id; Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate
Preezeouts, 87 YALE LJ. 1354, 1357-59 (1978).
186. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43.
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stockholders" owned a majority of Paramount's voting stock. 7 The
court noted that Delaware's General Corporation Law requires approval
by a majority vote of the stockholders for many of the most fundamental
corporate changes," and this protection becomes ineffectual when one
stockholder holds a majority." Further, the Paramount stockholders
will have no leverage in the future to demand a control premium or to
establish devices to protect their interests after the Paramount-Viacom
merger, when they are no longer a majority." The court held that un-
der these circumstances, the Paramount directors had an obligation to
act "reasonably to seek the transaction offering the best value reasonably
available to the stockholders"'91 and to uphold the fiduciary duties that
generally attach in a sale of control context.
12
To avoid implicating Revlon duties, Paramount argued that this case
should be resolved like Time-Warner, where defensive measures against
an attacker were permitted to stand and Revlon duties did not attach."
187. Id.
188. Id. Corporate changes that require approval by a majority of stockholders un-
der the Delaware General Corporation Law include: elections of directors, amend-
ments to the certificate of incorporation, mergers, consolidations, sales of all or sub-
stantially all of the assets of the corporation, and dissolution. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit
8, §§ 211, 242, 251-258, 263, 271, 275 (1993).
189. The court listed, in Paramount v. QVC, the powers a controlling stockholder
will have:
(a) elect directors; (b) cause a break-up of the corporation; (c) merge it with
another company;, (d) cash-out the public stockholders; (e) amend the certifi-
cate of incorporation; (f) sell all or substantially all of the corporate assets;
or (g) otherwise alter materially the nature of the corporation and the public
stockholders' interests.
Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43. The court failed to note, however, that these pow-
ers do not come free from responsibility. A majority stockholder is held to some of
the highest burdens of care under scenarios such as those listed by the court. See F.
HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLD-
ERS § 1:02 (1993 & Supp. 1994) (noting that absent intervening laws, a majority can
deprive a minority of an effective voice in corporate governance or can act in its own
interests to the detriment of the minority under pure principles of majority rule).
190. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 42-43.
191. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
192. Id. "(Tihe directors must act in accordance with their fundamental duties of
care and loyalty." Id. (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286
(Del. 1989)).
193. Id. at 46. Ironically, Paramount was the attacker in Time-Warner, and the
defensive tactics were used against its hostile bid. See Time-Warner, 571 A.2d 1140,
1146-48 (Del. 1990). Now, when Paramount attempts the same actions undertaken by
its target only a few years ago, it is proscribed by the court because it chose an
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The court remained unpersuaded and distinguished Time-Warner, hold-
ing that unlike Time-Warner, this case involved a change of control.'"
Although the court's statement of the facts reveals its animosity to-
wards Redstone and Viacom, the court did not find that the directors
were self interested or engaged in the type of self-perpetuating transac-
tions" against which an auction is intended to protect." There exist-
ed none of the silver lining provisions a self-interested board would typ-
ically provide for itself, such as golden parachute agreements," the cre-
ation of "rabbi trusts,"" extended pension plans or long-term em-
ployment contracts. The greatest fault the court could ascribe to the
inappropriate merger candidate, one that had a single majority shareholder. It is likely
that the result in this case would have been vastly different if Viacom had been
owned by a 'fluid aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders." See Paramount v. QVC,
637 A.2d at 43.
194. Id. at 46-48.
195. Id. The only indication of self interested activity is that of Davis in the initial
meetings with Redstone when Davis may have conditioned the possibility of a merger
on his remaining chief executive officer of the combined entity. See infra note 215.
Although not clear at this early stage, whatever weak indication of impropriety this
may have been, it was in no way enough to taint the entire board of directors with
self-serving intentions sufficient to remove the protections of the business judgment
rule from its decisions.
196. On the surface, it appears that an auction is not intended to protect against di-
rector impropriety, but to maximize shareholder value. This, however, falls to ac-
knowledge that except when the directors are acting in their own self-interests to the
exclusion of other shareholders, their interests as stockholders coincide with the
other stockholders' interests, provided the directors own stock (and they usually do).
A director will naturally seek to bolster share value because as a shareholder, the
director will benefit. The auction is merely a prophylactic rule that attempts to con-
fine directors to serving no interests other than attaining the highest price per share.
Therefore, the primary intended purpose must be to prevent self-interested, self-pro-
moting director misconduct.
197. A "golden parachute agreement" is a special employment agreement between
the company and top executives giving the executive extremely lucrative severance
pay in the event of a change in control. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 26, at 2138.
Depending on precisely how lucrative, these agreements are often referred to as ei-
ther "silver" or "tin" parachutes. Id. In 1984, Congress amended the Internal Revenue
Code to create a 2096 nondeductible excise tax on persons who receive "excess para-
chute payments." 26 U.S.C. § 4999 (1988 & Supp. 1994). Section 280G provides a
comprehensive definition of parachute payments and when they become "excess." 26
U.S.C. § 280G(b) (1988 & Supp. 1994). The Delaware Supreme Court has considered
the validity of golden parachute agreements on several occasions. See Gilbert v. El
Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559,
A.2d 1261, 1266 (Del. 1989); Kramer v. Western Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348 (DeL
1988); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
198. In merger and acquisition vernacular, a "rabbi trust" is a trust established to
fund payment of golden parachute agreements, or other employee benefits, that will
come due in the future. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 26, at 2138.
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Paramount board was that they remained "prisoners of their own mis-
conceptions and missed opportunities to eliminate the restrictions they
had-imposed on themselves.""
Having expanded the duty to auction to all change of control situa-
tions, the court still needed to apply this standard to these facts to hold
that Paramount's defensive measures in the Original Merger Agreement
were impermissible. Because there was a change of control, the court
could have done this by finding that Paramount should have initiated an
auction. Instead, the court held that because QVC wanted to bid when
Paramount sold control, Paramount had initiated a type of de facto auc-
tion. This de facto auction was not even foreshadowed by earlier cas-
es. 
2W
While it was easier for the court to find an auction was taking place
when evaluating the propriety of maintaining the defensive measures in
the Original Merger Agreement, the court concluded that enactment of
the defensive measures was improper as a breach of the board's duty to
act as auctioneer."' To arrive at this conclusion, the court must have
found that, at the time the measures were adopted, there was already an
auction taking place. This is a difficult conclusion, unless it is premised
on the rule that all changes of control must result in auctions, especially
when, at the time of the Original Merger Agreement, QVC had not yet
199. Paramount v. QVC, 697 A.2d at 50.
200. Id In Time-Warner, the court approved of the concept that when a transaction
does not involve a "change of control," Revlon duties do not attach; but the court
had not previously held that in all cases involving a "change of control," Revlon du-
ties always do attach. See Time-Warner, 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-51 (DeL 1990). The
distinction is significant because in the past, Revlon duties have always arisen where
there is an admitted auction taking place. See, e.g., Mills, 559 A.2d at 1266. Never
before has the court held that a "de facto" auction could arise merely because a
company enters a transaction involving its own sale and there exists another poten-
tial acquirer equally interested in being a bidder, who has not yet submitted a bid.
201. Paramount v. QVC, 637 K2d at 49, 50. This conclusion is drawn from the
phrasing the court used in analyzing the defensive measures. The court did not apply
a Unocal analysis to. these defensive measures alone, or it would have evaluated
whether the QVC bid was a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness. Furthermore,
the court would have examined the reasonableness of adopting these defensive mea-
sures in response to that threat. See infra notes 206-35 and accompanying text (ap-
plying the Unocal test to the facts of Paramount v. QVC). Instead, it evaluated
whether the Paramount board gave sufficient attention to other "potential bidders."
Paramount v. QVC, 637 .2d at 39. This is the heart of an auctioneer's duty, but not
part of the board's consideration when adopting defensive measures in a Unocal sce-
nario.
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made a bid.' "The Paramount Board, albeit unintentionally, had 'initi-
ate[d] an active bidding process seeking to sell itself by agreeing to sell
control of the corporation to Viacom in circumstances where another po-
tential acquiror (QVC) was equally interested in being a bidder."' At
that point, however, there was little indication that QVC was anything
more than one of the many suitors that had come calling in the past
several years while Paramount had been considering possible mergers or
acquisitions in the communications industry.' Finding a de facto auc-
tion is not only a stretch of the facts, but an unruly standard with indis-
cernible boundaries.' Moreover, it prevented the court from analyzing
the defensive measures under the Unocal standard, a threshold created
for that very purpose.
2. Unocal Analysis
When a corporation adopts defensive measures in response to a threat
to corporate control, courts generally apply a simple Unocal analysis.'
In Paramount v. QVC, the court acknowledged the applicability of
Unocal,' but did not take the analytical steps required by the test.
Rather, the court focused on the change of control that occurred to justi-
202. Id. The Original Merger Agreement was approved by the Paramount Board on
September 12, 1993. Id. It was not until September 20, after a number of public
statements and Redstone's infamous description of the merger as a "'marriage' that
would 'never be tom asunder'e " that Diller sent Davis a letter proposing a merger
between Paramount and QVC. Id.
203. Id. at 47.
204. See Chancery Opinion, 635 A.2d 1245, 1258 (Del. Ch. 1993), qfJd, 637 A.2d 34
Del. 1994). After the Time-Warner fiasco, it is not surprising that Paramount execu-
tives were reluctant to actively pursue any offer they received. See supra notes 109-
43 and accompanying text. Another irony in this case exists in that had Viacom not
presented itself, QVC would likely have been rejected outright and no case would
ever have been required. The protections of the business judgment rule after a
Unocal analysis would have permitted the board to adopt a "just say no defense" and
reject all offers. See Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1152 ("We have repeatedly stated that
the refusal to entertain an offer may comport with a valid exercise of a board's busi-
ness judgment."); Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 26, at 2139 (defining the "just say no
defense" as when a target board simply rejects the bidder's offer as inadequate and
does not redeem or invalidate poison pill rights). See generally Robert A. Prentice &
John H. Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers and the "Nancy Reagan Defense" : May
Target Boards 'Just Say No'? Should They be Allowed To?, 15 DEL J. CORP. L 377
(19N0).
205. See infra text accompanying note 272 (discussing the legal uncertainty of any
test triggered by a "change of control").
206. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
207. See Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 36.
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fy application of the higher standard and increased duties mandated by
Revlon.ns
Without the application of Revlon duties, the result would have been
vastly different. The court's conclusions in Time-Warner, where in
Revlon duties did not devolve and the analysis concerned only potential
violations of Unocal,' demonstrate the difference such an analysis
would have made. In Time-Warner, the board was "convinced that
Warner would provide the best 'fit' for Time to achieve its strategic ob-
jectives.""' Further, under Unocal duties alone, "[tlhe refusal to enter-
tain an offer may comport with a valid exercise of a board's business
judgment.""' The court found that "Time's board was under no obliga-
tion to negotiate with Paramount""' and the directors were not obligat-
ed to abandon their corporate plan for long-term shareholder profit.12
In this case, the closest the court came to applying the Unocal test
was reciting the parallel test used in an auction scenario.2 "4 Applying
Unocal, the board's actions would have been protected by the business
judgment rule after the court addressed the threshold questions of
whether the directors had "reasonable grounds for believing that a dan-
ger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed" and whether the defen-
sive measures were reasonable in relation to the threat."
208. Id. at 43-46.
209. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del. 1990).
210. Id. at 1152.
211. Id This does not necessarily mean that a "just say no" defense is clearly per-
missible. By many accounts, the law remains in a state of flux. See, e.g., Prentice &
Langmore, supra note 204, at 411.
212. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1154.
213. Id.
214. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994). The test the court recited
from Macmillan is very similar to a Unocal framing of the issue, but set in an auc-
tion context. See id. at 44. Its application is irrelevant here, however, because the
court never saw fit to apply the test and the court's analysis does not reach such
questions directly. Id.
215. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. Unocal also requires courts to insure that the
directors were not acting "solely or primarily out of a desire to perpetuate them-
selves in office . . . ," but were acting with due care from an informed position,
"motivated by a good faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and its stock-
holders." Id. There was no indication in the fact scenario presented by the court that
Davis or any of the other board members were acting to perpetuate themselves in of-
fice. Testimony submitted to the Court of Chancery, however, indicated that the 1990
negotiations between Paramount and Viacom may have broken down because Mr.
Davis insisted that he become CEO and Mr. Redstone retain a voting control upon
the merger of the two entities. See Chancery Opinion, 635 A.2d 1245, 1248 (Del. Ch.
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Since 1983, Paramount has actively pursued a strategic restructuring
plan devoted to transforming it into a major entertainment and publish-
ing company, making it well aware of the threat an inadequate merger
partner would pose to achieving these goals."' It is undisputed that the
board was well informed of the strategic plan and saw its implementa-
tion as in the best interests of the company and the stockholders."7 In
pursuit of these goals, Paramount unsuccessfully attempted to acquire
Time in 1989' and thereafter considered merging with or acquiring sev-
eral other video media companies, with no success." It was not until
the Viacom transaction that the board was again satisfied that it had
found a company that would fit its long-range strategic goals. An eval-
uation of the two bidders in this case reveals a strong reason supporting
Paramount's view of the QVC bid as a threat to corporate effectiveness,
especially considering that it threatened a nearly completed merger with
Viacom.
QVC is a general merchandise retailer that sells products nationwide
through a televised shopping network that has become one of the leading
networks of its kind in the United States.' Though it has grown sub-
stantially in recent years, QVC is a smaller company than either Viacom
or Paramount and controls only a limited number of other enter-
prises."2 Viacom is a diversified entertainment and communications
company that controls, among other entities, two core networks: MTV
Networks and Showtime Networks Inc.' These two primary networks
control a number of basic cable television networks, including MTV, VH-
1, Nickelodeon/Nick at Nite, and premium networks including Showtime,
1993), afd, 637 A.2d 34 (DeL 1994). There was no question, however, that the cur-
rent round of negotiations presumed these two conditions, and were never a point of
contention. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 38.
216. See Chancery Opinion, 635 A.2d at 1248.
217. See id. The court noted that-
The record establishes that Paramount's board was well informed of
Paramount's strategic goals and of the steps taken by management to achieve
those objectives. For example, at a board retreat in early May 1993, the
board was presented with, and considered, four books detailing Paramount's
long-range strategic aims and the alternative methods of achieving them. Man-
agement had been exploring alternatives with Viacom, Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. and TCI, as well as other entities that they believed would fit
the strategic plan.
Id. (citations omitted).
218. See Time-Warner, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
219. Chancery Opinion, 635 A.2d at 1248.
220. Id. at 1247. The company broadcasts television programs that display and dis-
cuss an item for sale. Id. The price is displayed on the screen with a running tally
of how many customers have called in to place an order. Id,
221. ld at 1248.
222. Id. at 1247.
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The Movie Channel, and FLIX. Additionally, Viacom controls a portion
of three joint venture cable services: Comedy Central, Lifetime and the
All News Channel.'
The companies are not on equal footing when considering access to
the public, success in the entertainment industry, or product name recog-
nition. The Paramount board undoubtedly feared the new entity would
miss out on the strategic advantages of a merger with Viacom should
QVC's offer succeed.' The board's investigation of the available alter-
natives, which had been ongoing for as much as a decade, was far more
extensive than necessary to satisfy the first prong of the Unocal du-
ties. Therefore, the court would have found that the board had rea-
sonable grounds to believe the QVC bid was a threat to corporate policy
and effectiveness. Whether the steps taken by the Paramount board were
reasonable in relation to the threat posed is a more difficult issue.
As noted by the court, the combination of a No-Shop Provision, a 100
million dollar Termination Fee, and a stock option to purchase almost
2096 of Paramount's outstanding stock was a very potent, and arguably
"draconian" package of defensive measures.' Analyzed individually,
however, their effect is more reasonable. As to the Termination Fee, the
costs of a transaction approaching ten billion dollars will, in most cases,
approach the one hundred million dollar range, and courts have held that
a termination fee of approximately 1% is within the range of reasonable-
223. Id.
224. I&
225. See id. at 1248. These strategic advantages have been called "synergistic goals"
by some commentators. See Policastro, supra note 74, at 202-03 (noting that in the
period post-Revlon, pre-Time-Warner, there was some doubt as to whether "friendly
negotiations between companies having synergistic goals could be defeated simply by
a third-party's higher offer," and concluding that the court could not have intended to
take such a drastic step consistent with Unocal and its precedents) (citing RONALD J.
GUSON, ThE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISmONS 387 (1986) ("[T]wo plus
two equals four, synergy exists when the answer is five or more.")).
226. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (DeL 1985). It was
precisely this type of analysis of strategic "fit" that the court found sufficient to satis-
fy the information requirements of Unocal in Time-Warner. See Time-Warner, 571
A.2d 1140, 1153-54 (Del. 1990). Time had explored available merger alternatives with
various entertainment companies and concluded that Warner, not Paramount, provided
the best strategic fit. Id.
227. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d 34, 39, 50-51 (Del. 1994). The court was most
concerned with the Put Feature and the Note Feature of the Stock Option
Agreement, which effectively assured Viacom a substantial and limitless payout that it
could purchase with senior subordinated debt should the deal fall through. l at 39.
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ness.' The No-Shop Provision can also be construed as reasonable as
long as a board does not use it to avoid its fiduciary duties. By itself, a
No-Shop Provision is not an unreasonable concession for a strong merg-
er candidate to ask of a target when the parties believe an auction is not
taking place.'
Notwithstanding, the fact that the stock option agreements, "put" and
"note" features and no cap on its maximum value had the power alone to
end any auction in process, the court would likely find few situations
when this would be reasonable absent a clear intention on the part of
the raider to bust-up the target.' Combined with the other elements of
this defensive package, the inclusion of the Stock Option Agreement
could easily be described as an overkill."l Addressing these items
individually, the court should have found that though the stock option
agreement was excessive and unreasonable in relation to the threat
posed, the Termination Fee and No-Shop Agreements were reasonable
and enforceable.
However, the court defined Paramount's'duties more broadly. Because
of the perceived change of control, the court expected Paramount not
only to evaluate Viacom's offer in the abstract under a Unocal standard,
but to compare it to the QVC transaction as required when an auction is
already in progress.' The court described these duties as: (a) to be
228. In fact, this precise termination fee was deemed reasonable by the Chancery
Court in this case. Chancery Opinion, 635 A.2d at 1270-71. The court reasoned that
because the fee was negotiated, as is evidenced by the 3096 reduction from the origi-
nally proposed amount, both parties agreed that the amount of this termination fee
would actually be the costs of consummating the transaction, the Termination Fee
was a permissible liquidated amount of damages and enforceable. Id. The Delaware
Supreme Court's dismissal of this reasoning demonstrates its preoccupation with find-
ing the defensive measures unreasonable. See Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 50.
229. No-Shop provisions have been construed as reasonable in a number of cases,
usually when insisted upon by a bidder who is entering into a merger agreement
with the target. See, e.g., Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1151 n.15. However, they are
often viewed skeptically by the court. See supra note 108.
230. See supra note 158 (describing the stock option agreement in Paramount v.
QVC).
231. One commentator has noted the importance that target management resist "the
urge to indulge in tunnel vision, narrowly focused zealousness and overkilL" Fred B.
White, III, Directors' Duties in Corporate Takeovers, Mergers, and Acquisitions, in
BANK MERGERS AND ACQUISrrIONS, at 7 (PI Corp. L & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 857, 1994). Both parties in a transaction should resist the tendency to load
the transaction with "lock up" arrangements, especially before a market test has oc-
curred, because arrangements that are preclusive of competition "are looked at with
a jaundiced judicial eye." Id. at part III.
232. Instead of applying the well known Unocal test, the court recited a two-part
test derived from Unocal as stated in Macmillan that applies when "competing bid-
ders are not treated equally." Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45. The Macmillan test
requires that "[iun the face of disparate treatment, the trial court must first examine
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"diligent and vigilant" in critically examining both the Paramount-Viacom
transaction and the QVC tender offers; (b) to act in good faith; (c) to ob-
tain and act on all material information reasonably available to determine
which of these offers, "or an alternative course of action, would provide
the best value'a reasonably available to the stockholders; and (d) to ne-
gotiate actively and in good faith with both Viacom and QVC to that
end."'a
The court had no doubt that Paramount's board failed to fulfill these
duties under this standard.'a This was not surprising once the court
found that the Revlon duty to act as an impartial auctioneer applied. Un-
aware that such Revlon duties had arisen, the Paramount board had no
reason to respond to QVC's hostile bid as an impartial auctioneer. Even
if it had, however, one final idiosyncrasy of this case would have pre-
vented the Paramount board from attaining what the court thought was
the highest value for the stockholders. Specifically, the court's narrow in-
terpretation of what was in the "best interest" of stockholders, namely
short-term profits, would have resulted in the same disposition despite
Paramount's evaluation of QVC's bid under auction-like conditions since
the board's interpretation of "best interest" included long-range planning.
whether the directors properly perceived that shareholder interests were enhanced."
Id. Second, "the board's action must be reasonable in relation to the advantage
sought to be achieved, or conversely, to the threat which a particular bid allegedly
poses to stockholder interests." Id. The court then stated the key features of an en-
hanced scrutiny test:
(a) [A] judicial determination regarding the adequacy of the decisionmaldng
process employed by the directors, including the information on which the di-
rectors based their decision; and (b) a judicial examination of the reasonable-
ness of the directors' action in light of the circumstances then existing ....
[A] court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the
directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision .... [Ciourts
will not substitute their business judgment for that of the directors, but will
determine if the directors' decision was, on balance, within a range of rea-
sonableness.
Id, Though stating Macmillan as the test, the court applied these elements of en-
hanced scrutiny to whether Paramount had fulfilled its Revlon duties. Id. at 45-4&
233. See infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the
court's "best interest" test on long-range corporate planning).
234. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 48.
235. Id, at 49 ("We conclude that the Paramount directors' process was not reason-
able, and the result achieved for the stockholders was not reasonable under the cir-
cumstances.").
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From any angle, Paramount v. QVC brought a novel interpretation to the
cases the court claimed controlled its actions.
IV. THE IMPACT AND APPLICATION OF A DUTY TO AUCTION
Beyond the question of whether the court properly decided Para-
mount v. QVC under existing precedent is the question whether the
court should continue down this new path it has embarked upon. The
answer depends on whether an auction is in fact an efficient and effec-
tive way to protect the interests of the parties involved.' Resolution of
this inextricably policy laden question requires consideration of the ways
in which a corporate auction impacts both society and individual stock-
holders. 7 For the individual stockholder, the result of an auction is
clear stockholders immediately receive the highest possible amount of
cash per share. On a societal level, a well-policed auction has the virtue
of reducing director self dealing at shareholder expense. However, these
benefits come with some significant costs to both society as a whole and
the resulting corporation. These costs are more subtle, and their analysis
more complex, than a simple cash equivalent test.' They impact four
236. One would expect the "interests of the parties involved" in a merger or acqui-
sition to include stockholders and the society at large as the two primary interests,
but as the investment world has evolved an interesting conflict has developed. Institu-
tional investors now hold close to one half of the total equity of United States com-
panies, and it has been asserted that they do not carry the same motivations as the
individual stockholder to further the long-range profitability of a corporation. See
Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 13, at 205-06. This would indicate stockholder inter-
ests should be considered in two separate categories, one including institutional inves-
tors whose primary concern is maximizing short-term share value, and one including
the individual investor who is more likely to want to further the long-range success
of the enterprise. See id. at 206-07; MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETrIVE ADVANTAGE
OF NATIONS 528-29 (1990) (noting the strong incentive institutional investors give their
managers to maximize short-term quarterly and annual profit).
237. Especially in Delaware, it is still unclear exactly to what extent a corporate
board is under an obligation to consider interests other than the stockholders and
when those interests are of sufficient importance to control its actions. See Kreider,
supra note 26, at 636 (discussing external interests that a board may consider when
evaluating a tender offer, including "the presumed effects of a successful offer upon
employees, communities, suppliers, creditors, customers, the state and national econo-
mies, and community and societal considerations"). As of 1991, at least 29 state legis-
latures had enacted "Constituency Statutes" permitting boards to consider interests
other than those of shareholders. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 13, at 214-15 &
n.83 (citing as examples ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990);,
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A.6-1 (West Supp. 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717 (McKinney
1989); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1721(c) (1990)).
238. A simple cash equivalent test appears to be what the court would have pre-
ferred, as indicated by its suggestion that the board attempt to quantify the value of
stock or other non-cash consideration to achieve an "objective comparison of the
alternatives." Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 44.
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primary areas: long-range corporate planning,' the frequency and likeli-
hood of consensual mergers in the future, ' the ability of auctioned
companies to survive the auction process," and the impact of auctions
on remaining minority shareholders in the resulting corporation.'
A. Impact of a Duty to Auction on Long-Range Planning
The impact that a duty to auction will have on long-range planning
must be analyzed on two levels: the use of auctions generally and the use
of an auction like the one the court expected in Paramount v. QVC. The
separate analysis is necessary because, unfortunately, the impact is dif-
ferent.
1. The Impact of the Use of Auctions on Planning
In the early-eighties there was a considerable scholarly debate on
whether auctioning companies benefited or harmed investors and society
as a whole. Though no consensus was ever officially reached because the
Delaware Supreme Court apparently decided the issue in Revlon, this
was the first time scholars carefully analyzed whether an auction of a
corporation was beneficial to society and stockholders.' Two primary
239. See irIfra notes 243-67 and accompanying text.
240. See infra notes 268-72 and accompanying text.
241. See infra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
242. See infra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
243. Two primary groups of opposing views developed. One side consisted of then
Professor, now Judge Frank H. Easterbrook and Professor Daniel R. Flschel, who
began the debate with two preliminary articles. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARtv. L REV. 1161 (1981); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW.
1733 (1981). The opposing group included Lucian A. Bebchuk and Ronald J. Gilson
and their series of rebuttal articles. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L REV. 23 (1982); see
also Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95
HARv. L REV. 1028 (1982); Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure
Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L REV. 51 (1982); Ronald J. Gilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations: "The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender
Offers, 33 STAN. L REV. 819 (1981). Though this Comment does not adopt wholesale
the views of either position, the author believes the reflections of Easterbrook and
Flschel more accurately reflect the realities of an auction scenario. See Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers,, 35
STAN. L REV. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Sunk Costs].
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criticisms of auctions were recognized. First, requiring the use of an auc-
tion increased the price tag of acquisitions in general and thereby dis-
couraged potential acquirers from bidding.2 Without the threat of a
hostile takeover to force management to use a corporation's resources
for their highest and best uses, management could become lax with
stockholders in no position to analyze their performance in a meaningful
way.' Second, auctions place the first bidder at a disadvantage be-
cause that bidder must go to the expense of preparing an initial bid and
researching the target, receiving no benefit from these additional costs if
a second bidder can step in and steal the target away with a marginally
higher bid.'
In light of these criticisms, it is not in a company's best interest to
spend time and effort carefully selecting a merger candidate that will
maximize the use of resources in both companies. When management
concludes that it must acquire another company to avoid becoming a
target, 7 it need only find a good acquisition candidate by watching
what others in the industry are doing, regardless of whether this is the
244. See Sunk Costs, supra note 243, at 2.
245. Id. The argument that the threat of a hostile takeover encourages inefficient
managers to improve their performance, entitled the "managerial discipline model" by
its critics, has been forcefully challenged. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the
Market for Corporate Control A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in
Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. Rav. 1145, 1242-43 (1984); Lipton & Rosenblum,
supra note 13, at 201-05 ("[T]he threat of a hostile takeover is far more likely to
create an attitude of defensiveness on the part of managers than to create an open-
ness to the kind of change and new ideas that might serve to improve business per-
formance.").
246. Sunk Costs, supra note 243, at 2. As noted in Sunk Costs, the primary cost to
initial bidders is that they are not compensated for their research in discovering a
potential acquisition candidate because the auction leaves no protection for the infor-
mation they have expended funds and effort to acquire. Id, at 4-5. In other areas of
the law, such as contract law or real estate law, a person who desires to purchase
an item or a plot of land needs not disclose his reasons for doing so, and can there-
by benefit from the effort expended to acquire the information through increased
profit in the transaction. Id. at 5. The securities industry, however, requires extensive
disclosure. Id. This prevents bidders from benefiting from the funds expended on re-
search and information development unless the first bidder can obtain a bargain pur-
chase price, which is impossible when the law imposes an auction at the whim of an
intervening bidder. Id. (noting that even the "Saturday Night Special," which permitted
a raider to benefit from information development, is no longer permissible under the
Williams Act). This lack of benefit from the research process will discourage future
companies from spending the money and effort to develop the Information when they
can ride the coattails of another bidder. Id. at 5-6. The result will be a decrease in
the scrutiny with which potential acquirers scrutinize the performance of manage-
ment, resulting in more inefficient management. Id. at 6.
247. For an extensive discussion of the factors that make a company vulnerable to
a takeover, see 2 BYRON E. Fox & ELEANOR M. Fox, Fox & Fox CORPORATE ACQUISI-
TIONS AND MERGERS § 27.07[1l]b] (1994).
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most efficient combination possible. Conversely, if management con-
cludes that it has become a target that will likely be acquired in the near
future, there is little incentive to make long-range plans when it will have
no control over either its future or the selection of a merger candi-
date.' Therefore, a rule requiring auctions is likely to decrease, rather
than increase, the quantity and quality of long-range planning by corpo-
rate boards and management.
2. The Impact of an Auction as Defined by Paramount v. QVC
The key to success in business is long-range planning. Through careful
planning, a company preempts impending disasters and profits from
predicted trends. Planning for a hostile tender offer or a strategic merger
combination is no less important than any other kind of planning, and in
many cases, is more important.' The court apparently recognized this
in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,ns when it affirmed a posi-
tion it had long held, that a board may consider "the bidder's identity,
pr.or background and other business venture experiences; and the
bidder's business plans for the corporation and their effects on stock-
holder interests." " The court in Paramount v. QVC quoted this passage
from Macmillan favorably' and indicated that these were the factors a
board should use when determining which alternative is most likely to
offer the "best value" to the stockholders.'m Notwithstanding, when the
court conducted its own evaluation of the offers, it gave little, if any,
merit to the Paramount board's determination that a merger with Viacom
was more consistent with its long-range strategic vision for the compa-
ny?
248. The selection of a merger candidate can be a form of corporate planning in
itself. See iftra note 253 and accompanying text.
249. The court's very acknowledgment that a corporation may plan against its own
destruction under certain circumstances recognizes that the "corporate enterprise has
an independent interest" in its own success. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 13,
at 203.
250. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); see supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
251. Mills, 559 A.2d at 1282 n.29.
252. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994).
253. Id.
254. IdA. at 48. This lack of attention to long-range planning when Revlon duties at-
tach is one of the few areas for which the court does not give a board credit, and
is in fact one in which the court requires the board to make long-range plans, as
evidenced by the court's comments in Time-Warner, 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990).
In Time-Warner, the court chose not to analyze the issue based on long versus short
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In this case, the court's reluctance to credit the board's business judg-
ment was apparently based upon the conclusion that after a Paramount-
Viacom transaction, Viacom, and therefore Sumner Redstone, would have
the voting power to alter the company's long-term vision.as By adopting
this approach, the court limited the factors a board may consider to
those it would have the power to enforce at the end of the day. Taken to
its logical conclusion, a board cannot reasonably consider its vision for
the corporation as a factor when selecting among suitors whenever a
change of control is contemplated, since its vision will be irrelevant once
the transaction is complete. The problem with this reasoning is that a
board's lack of ability to implement its vision is not a reason to ignore a
suitor's conformity with that vision, but rather a reason to put special
focus on strategic compatibility. Even when, as in Paramount v. QVC,
the target board will lose the ability to shape the company's long-range
plan after a transaction,' there is no single more defining moment in a
company's future than the selection of a merger candidate. An acquirer
with a similar vision and a track record in accordance with that vision
will have less motivation to abandon the target's corporate strategy, even
if the acquirer may have that power after a change of control. 7 Stated
in the context of the Paramount-Viacom deal, the court was quick to
point out that as a controlling stockholder, Redstone could alter the
corporate strategy,'M but failed to recognize that since the companies
were such a good strategic fit, there was no conceivable reason for him
to do so. Thus, a target's board protects stockholder interests when it in-
sists on a suitor that will likely continue to implement the predetermined
corporate strategy it has concluded is in the best interests of the compa-
ny. 2
term interests, because "dlrectors, generally, are obligated to chart a course for a
corporation which is in its best interests without regard to a fixed investment hori-
zon." Id. It was apparently a foregone conclusion that the target board must consider
long range interests, unless the company was "for sale." See id, The problem with
this position, however, is that if the sale will not be followed by a bust-up, someone
should be looldng out for the long-range interests of the company during the auction
process. If not the board, who?
255. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43; see also Gentile, supra note 10, at 906
(supporting the court's conclusion based on this reasoning).
256. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43.
257. In fact, the court has explicitly stated that "[d]irectors are not obliged to aban-
don a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless
there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy." Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at
1154. If there is a possibility of maintaining corporate strategy by selecting an appro-
priate purchaser, it can hardly be said that there is clearly no basis to sustain the
corporate strategy. See id,
258. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43.
259. From this perspective, it was reasonable for the board to capitulate to
Viacom's demands and institute defensive measures as part of negotiations. See supra
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This, however, was not the conclusion of the court in Paramount v.
QVC, and a company's long-range plan can be given no such consider-
ation in an auction setting.' If the target board must determine fair
value in the same way the court did in Paramount v. QVC, it must apply
the "best interest" test in the same manner as did the court." While ac-
knowledging in passing that the decisions of a board are complex and
should be extended deference, the court was content to reduce its analy-
sis to one solitary factor monetary value.' Determining what is in the
best interest of a company is highly subjective and difficult to analyze,
and precisely the kind of decision the business judgment rule exists to
protect.' After quoting the language in Mills to show the factors the
board could consider, the court continued with its "best value" analysis
without applying the business judgment rule and did not recount or ad-
dress the following statement, also appearing in Mills:
Circumstances may dictate that an offer be rebuffed, given the nature and timing
of the offer, its legality, feasibility and effect on the corporation and the stock-
holders; the alternatives available and their effect on the various constituencies,
particularly the stockholders; the company's long term strategic plans; and any
special factors bearing on stockholder and public interests!"
notes 206-35 and accompanying text. Recognizing the value of the alliance and seek-
ing to avoid the fiasco that resulted when Paramount's negotiations with Time fell
through, it is not surprising that Viacom insisted on defensive measures of this mag-
nitude. Id. The extensive negotiation necessary to agree on the specifics of the defen-
sive measures also indicate their reasonableness. See Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at
38-39;, Chancery Opinion, 635 A2d 1245, 1248-52 (Del. CI. 1993), c0fd, 637 A.2d 34
(Del. 1994).
260. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 50.
261. See id. at 44-45 (discussing the "best interest" test).
262. This focus reveals itself in the court's language throughout the case: "With the
QVC hostile bid offering greater value to the Paramount stockholders .... " Id at
40.
[T]he value of the revised QVC offer on its face exceeded that of the Viacom
offer by over $1 billion at then current values. This significant disparity of
value cannot be justified on the basis of the directors' vision of future strate-
gy, primarily because the change of control would supplant the authority of
the current Paramount Board to continue to hold and implement their strate-
gic vision in any meaningful way.
Id. at 50. "QVC's unsolicited bid presented the opportunity for significantly greater
value for the stockholders.. . ." Id at 51. Each of these examples evidences the way
the court considered "value" based on monetary amount alone, and considered "value"
and strategic planning as separate concepts.
263. See id. at 45.
264. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 n.35 (Del. 1989)
(emphasis added).
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The court's misunderstanding of the intangible advantages and disad-
vantages of a merger with one company over another is exemplified by
its suggestion that a board attempt to "quantify" noncash consideration
after telling the board to consider its view of the future value of a strate-
gic alliance when analyzing the entire situation.' In short, the court's
auction was not any ordinary auction, but one in which the target board
was limited to considering exclusively the estimated monetary value of
the offer.' This kind of auction carries with it all the expense and soci-
etal cost of auctions generally, and in addition, fails to account for the
long-range planning of a corporation. m7
B. The Future of the Consensual Merger
Though the primary fare through much of the nineties, the consensual
merger has been significantly weakened by Paramount v. QVC. Deal
makers have been acutely aware of the rest of the market for some
time,' but never have they been so helpless in the face of a competing
bid. After QVC, a Delaware corporation can no longer calculate for itself
a company that would best fit its corporate strategy and then negotiate
its own acquisition. The sale will become an auction dependent solely on
price if any other bidder seeks to enter the fray.' Whichever company
265. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 44.
266. This monetary value test is also extremely difficult to apply in practice be-
cause it oversimplifies a process that is profoundly more complex. First, it is often
difficult to determine which bid is in fact the higher bid, especially in cases such as
this where both parties are utilizing front-end loaded, two-tier highly coercive offers.
The value of the offer is directly contingent on the value of the securities offered by
the raider in the second tier. These prices often fluctuate dramatically as the bidding
process escalates, causing even the experts to disagree as to which offer is worth
more in reality. See, e.g., City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d
787, 792 (Del. Ch. 1988); Leo Herzel & Richard W. Shepro, Negotiated Acquistions:
The Impact of Competition in the United States, 44 Bus. LAw. 301, 305-06 (1989); see
generally Mirvis, supra note 26.
267. One of the most radical conclusions that can be drawn from the realities of a
price-only auction is that all defensive measures, including poison pills, will become
worthless. Whoever has the highest bid wins, no matter what defensive measures are
in place, because the winner can always go to court and have them struck down as
unreasonable if they protect a lower bid. No defensive actions against the highest
bidder could ever be reasonable.
268. See James C. Freund, A Turbulent Decade For Friendly Deals, NAT'L LJ., Nov.
11, 1985, at 13 (noting that "merging parties and their counsel spend as much time
worrying about what's going on 'out there' as 'in here'").
269. See supra notes 249-67 and accompanying text. A possible way to avoid this
dilemma is to create a transaction like the one the court approved in Time-Warner.
a merger of equals. See infra notes 289-92 and accompanying text (discussing the
Time-Warner "merger of equals" type of sale); Phillip J. Azzollini, Note, The Wake of
Paramount v. QVC: Can a Majority Shareholder Avoid Triggering the Auction Duty
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in a merger is perceived as taking an inferior position to the other, even
if this perception is anaccurate, will be subject to intervening hostile
takeover bids which it must consider on equal par with the carefully ne-
gotiated and evaluated original merger agreement. The parties must now
grapple with the court's hindsight, that will determine which company
put itself up for sale and implicated Revlon duties.'"
The bidding process in not cheap. A bidder often will "expend hun-
dreds of hours of time and millions of dollars" obtaining regulatory ap-
provals, negotiating merger agreements, printing tender offers or proxy
statements, and obtaining financing commitments." An open auction
offers no protection for this investment, and merger candidates are much
less likely to enter into voluntary negotiations when they will likely have
to give in to a raider with a higher bid.
A persistent set of questions will constantly plague merger candidates.
What is a change of control? Is there a particular percentage of owner-
ship that triggers Revlon duties? Can this amount be less than 50% if it
constitutes a controlling share? Does the existence of supermajority
provisions change the number necessary for a change of control?' If
shareholders indicate a willingness to vote with a raider even though no
formal action has taken place, is there a constructive change of control?
Where this level of uncertainty abounds, the wise are unlikely to tread.
During a Merger and Retain a Significant Equity Interest? Suggestion: A Pooling of
Interests, 63 FORDHAm L REV. 573, 596-98 (1994) (suggesting criteria for a "pooling"
arrangement whereby the companies would merge on an equal basis). Though this
type of transaction may be possible on the surface, there is no indication how Time-
Warner will survive Paramount v. QVC, because Time-Warner was decided before
the "change-of-control" language in Revlon became important to the court and when a
breakup of the company had to have been "inevitable" before Revlon duties attached.
See Time-Warner, 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-51 (Del. 1990).
270. This rule also increases the likelihood of wasteful deception in the early stages
of a negotiated transaction. See Sunk Costs, supra note 239, at 13 (noting one of the
strange effects of a rule requiring an auction: "An auctioneering rule simply reduces
the bidder's options and places prospective bidders in an awkward position if target's
managers use friendly overtures as signals to begin digging moats and trenches").
271. Kenneth J. Nachbar et al., The Duty to Achieve the Highest Price in the Sale
of the Company: Auctions and Alternatives, 8 DEL. LAW. 30, 30 (1991).
272. For a discussion of supermajority provisions and their legitimacy, see generally
Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Provision in Charter
or Bylaw Requiring SupermJority Vote, 80 A.LR.4th 667 (1990).
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C. The Fate of Auctioned Companies
A third consideration when evaluating the societal implications of
imposing a duty to auction is the impact of an auction on the resulting
company. Bids that were once considered outrageous have now become
commonplace, and a rule requiring an auction encourages this trend.
Although stockholders benefit from an increased cash payout, studies in
the late eighties indicated that most companies failed to receive a similar
benefit, and most acquirers failed to improve the performance of pur-
chased companies.'
Not only is it possible that acquirers will not improve the profitability
of companies, but Viacom and many other companies like it who actually
win auctions will face a tough battle bearing the weight of the extreme
debt loads necessary to win any leveraged auction. Selling off assets or
subsidiaries, or both, is often the only way a company can meet the ex-
orbitant interest payments on debt incurred in the process of a merg-
er
.24
D. Impact of Auctions on Remaining Minority Shareholders
Ironically, the requirement that the board conduct an auction to
achieve the highest price for shareholders has the potential of entirely
missing the mark for which the court was shooting. It is clear from the
extensive discussion of the minority's voting power after a takeover that
the court was concerned with protecting the remaining shareholders,
273. Herzel & Shepro, supra note 266, at 301 (citing then unpublished studies by
independent authors and the SEC Office of Economic Analysis to support the
"winner's curse" created by the legal rules that force acquirers to pay top dollar),
274. Viacom is an ideal example of this phenomenon. Not long after the Paramount-
Viacom merger, there was considerable speculation that Viacom would have to sell
assets to make ends meet, especially as its proposed merger with Blockbuster, which
would have infused much needed cash, began to fall through. See James Bates &
Kathryn Harris, Viacom May be Forced to Sell Off Assets; Mergers: It Will Need to
Trim Debt from Paramount Deal if Blockbuster Alliance Folds, LA. TIMS, Apr. 12,
1994, at D4; Dan Dorfman, Viacom Stock: A Dog or a Deal? USA TODAY, Apr. 15,
1994, at 4B (describing Sumner Redstone and Paramount-Viacom as "a wounded gladi-
ator and his band of supporters winning the battle, but losing the war"); John
Lippman, Malone Expects Viacom's Debt to Derail Blockbuster Merger Plan, LA.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 1994, at D4 (commenting on the prediction of TV magnate John C.
Malone); S & P Looks at Paramount-Viacom Debt, STA TRIB., Feb. 17, 1994, at D3
(Standard & Poors considers a downgrade of Paramount and Viacom debt in light of
the large amount of debt financing to fund the merger); Viacom Now is Fll Owner
of Paramount After Vote, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1994, at B9. This heavy debt load and
an intense need to increase stock value has pushed Viacom management into major
restructuring and drastic cost reduction methods. Anonymous interview, Universal
City, Cal. (Mar. 15, 1995).
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those who tendered in the second tier of the two-tier coercive offer as
well as those who were cashed-out in the first tier.' By nature, howev-
er, these stockholders benefit the least from the face value per share of
the offer. As the offerors bid up the front-tier cash price, the first to
tender are the ones who benefit from more cash. The remaining stock-
holders, who will likely be left with subordinated debt or highly diluted
equity securities will be left to rely on the company or a future stream of
income for repayment of their debt, or at minimum, to support the value
of their consideration.' A ten, twenty, or even thirty dollar per share
increase in the face value of an offer does not necessarily translate into
any increase in the back end although the raider will undoubtedly assert
that it does. The face value of the securities offered will increase, but the
actual value delivered to these remaining stockholders will be inversely
proportional to the amount of debt incurred through the bidding process,
because the market will likely view a highly leveraged company as a
poor investment option, and a drop in stock value may occur shortly
after the transaction is complete. It is, therefore, counter-productive to
encourage the highest possible bidding price when there is no limit on
the amount of leverage or the type of securities that can be offered in
the second tier. Greater leverage will place more strain on the company
whom the remaining stockholders rely upon for payment. The, very stock-
holders the court tried to protect will be the ones harmed the most. If a
"control premium," such as the court sought in Paramount v. QVC, is to
be awarded to anyone, it should be awarded to the remaining stockhold-
ers, those in the second tier.
Still, the most disturbing part of Paramount v. QVC is the lack of
competence the court ascribes to the Paramount shareholders. Whether
Viacom purchased the shares of the Paramount stockholders for cash,
leaving them no voting power and no remaining stake in the new corpo-
ration, or only purchased a portion of their shares, the stockholders have
the same say in approving a transaction in which they will lose voting
power as they do when they will be entirely cashed-out. In both scenari-
os, the board can only recommend a transaction. The stockholders must
tender their shares. These shareholders become no less capable of
weighing the worth of a particular transaction simply because the effect
of that transaction is to remove all their rights. Moreover, a significant
275. See Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d 34, 42-43 (Del. 1994).
276. While these minority shareholders may have the remedy of an accounting
available to them, knowledge of the company's poor financial condition will not guar-
antee payment
1587
minority of obstinate stockholders in the resulting company could create
considerable problems for the new management.'
V. A NEW APPROACH
Having concluded that the auction process has the potential to be not
only inefficient, but harmful to both stockholders and the community at
large, what approach should the court take when confronted with a
merger or acquisition issue that carries with it the "'omnipresent specter
that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than
those of the corporation and its shareholders?'"278 The range of
transactions posing this issue fall into four general categories and the
proper response varies with the category. The first category includes
those cases actually following the Revlon fact pattern, namely, when it is
inevitable that the sale of a company will result in a break-up of the
company.' The second category includes those cases where the major-
ity of the target board exhibits actual self-dealing in approving a transac-
tion, whether or not a fundamental corporate change occurs.' The
third category includes transactions involving a change in corporate
structure or governance whereby two groups of unaffiliated stockholders
combine to form the new entity on equal grounds."' Finally, the fourth
277. See ZOLMAN CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING § 161.11 &
n.1 (1995) (noting the reluctance of corporate management to enter into a situation
where it anticipates interference from minority stockholders who have the power to
bring individual or derivative suits to voice their opinions).
278. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986)
(quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (DeL 1985)).
279. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182; Mills Acquistion Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261, 1285 & n.35 (Del. 1989). The description of this category intentionally includes
only those sales that will result in a break-up of the company, instead of other
"sales" or transactions not resulting in a break-up. When a sale will not result in a
break-up, the Implications of the transaction from a long-term corporate strategy per-
spective are vastly different, as are the legal principles that should be applied to
account for the various concerns. This apparent blur between a "sale" and a "break-
up" that pervades the Revlon opinion has been previously noted. See Herzel &
Shepro, supra note 266, at 313 (quoting the "highly ambiguous key paragraph" in
Revlon in which the court describes the board's duty to auction); Policastro, supra
note 74, at 204 (discussing the Revlon court's interchangeable use of the terms "sale"
and "break-up").
280. E.g., Nixon v. Blackweli, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993).
When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction,
they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scru-
pulous inherent fairness of the bargain .... The requirement of fairness Is
unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a trans-
action, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass
the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.
281. This is the quintessential *merger of equals." See Time-Warner, 671 A.2d 1140,
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category exemplifies cases where an aggregate of stockholders sharing a
common affiliation lose the power to effect changes to the corporation
without the assent of a new group of affiliated stockholders.'
Treatment of each of these categories will be addressed seriatim.
The first category of transactions requires little discussion, as Revlon
properly decided the issue.' When the sale of a corporation becomes
inevitable, and all legitimate bidders intend to break-up the company
upon consummation of a deal, there are no long-range planning interests
and only minimal societal interests remain. The board of directors has
essentially one primary concern and nothing against which to balance
that interest. Whatever benefits may have endued to society through
preservation of the corporate form were removed by the acquirers when
they decided to bust-up the entity. The single overbearing concern is to
maximize shareholder value, and thus the role of the auctioneer is appro-
priate. This is where the standards developed by the court to govern auc-
tions should receive their application.
Cases within the second category, where the majority of a target board
exemplifies actual self-dealing, are also easily resolved.' Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc.' defined the controlling principles for cases in which the
directors in Delaware corporations are on both sides of a transaction.'
Entire fairness is required, and the court will exert the most exacting
scrutiny to see that this standard is met.28 Not only are these decisions
1446 (Del. 1990); Lou R. KLING & EILEEN N. SIMON, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COM-
PANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS § 22.01[1] (1994) (defining a merger of equals as
when "two companies of approximately the same size combine in a stock-for-stock
exchange with the ratio based upon their relative size or upon the ratio of their
unaffected trading prices"); see infra note 289 and accompanying text.
282. While this category includes what the Paramount v. QVC court considered a
change of control, the actual phrase was not used because it is fraught with uncer-
tainty and because the basis upon which the court defined the phrase in Paramount
v. QVC is inconsistent with Its previous usage. See itfra note 295 and accompanying
text. The distinction between affiliated stockholders and majority stockholders is also
significant and is explained iqfra note 297 and accompanying text
283. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181-82.
284. Actual self-dealing occurs inside and outside the merger and acquisition con-
text, most commonly outside when directors issue themselves stock or usurp a cor-
porate opportunity. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A-2d 503, 510 (DeL 1939) (discussing
usurpation of corporate opportunity).
285. 457 A.2d 701 (DeL 1983).
286. Id. at 710.
287. Id at 711. The court defined entire fairness:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price.
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unprotected by the business judgment rule, but they must also be entire-
ly fair to survive review.'
The third category has been called a "merger of equals" because that is
essentially what it entails, and the best example is Time-Warner.20 In
Time-Warner, two companies of essentially the same strength and of
complementary interests planned to merge but were stopped by a hostile
bid, forcing the merger to become an acquisition.2m The court held that
a tender offer that would result in the stockholders of each corporation
essentially controlling equal portions of the combined company did not
involve a change of control, as supported the chancellor's reasoning on
this point, and thus found that Revlon duties did not attach because a
break up of the company was not inevitable. 1 As a result, the pre-
sumption of the business judgment rule applied just as it does in non-
merger situations, protecting the discretion of the board and its
decisionmaking process.'
The final category is altogether different from the first three. It is the
category within which the Paramount-Viacom transaction falls. If, as sug-
gested previously, an auction is not the proper way to address these
cases, what rule should be applied? Any replacement of the auction
The former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it
was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the
approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter
aspect of fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the
proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings,
future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent
value of a company's stock.
Id.
288. This is one of the few areas of merger and acquisition law In which the court
has applied principles borrowed from the conflicts of interest field. See Mary Siegel,
Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A Proposal for Reform, 36 HASTINGS L. 377, 394-95
(1985).
289. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d 1140, 1146 (DeL 1990); see supra notes 109-43 and
accompanying text. KLING & SIMON, supra note 281, § 22.01 (discussing the "merger
of equals concept").
290. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1146.
291. Id.
292. See Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994); see also Martin Lipton &
Theodore N. Mirvis, Ten Questions And Answers Raised By Delaware 'Paramount'
Decision, N.Y.U., Feb. 10, 1994, at 5 (downplaying the significance of the opinion
generally and noting that a merger of equals is still possible). This is what some in
the industry have considered a safe-harbor from the unruliness of the Paramount v.
QVC standard. Unfortunately, this reliance may be misplaced because the Delaware
Supreme Court did not base its decision in Paramount v. QVC on the oft-quoted
language it used to describe the holding of Time-Warner regarding "a fluid aggrega-
tion of unaffiliated stockholders," Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43, but on the
change of control principles it obfuscated in Paramount v. QVC and particularly,
whether a change of control was inevitable. See id. at 44-45.
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called for by the court must accommodate the goals that drove the court
to its conclusion. These goals are centered on the concept of a control
premium.'
The court made clear that its primary goal was to provide the share-
holders with adequate compensation for their lost control, and a reason-
able control premium was necessary to adequately compensate, but not
overcompensate, the shareholders.' The court's usage of a control pre-
mium, however, is inconsistent with the uses of a control premium in
other contexts."'
In the traditional sense, a control premium is awarded when a single
person or affiliated group of persons or entities controls a block of stock
that a raider or other bidder needs to acquire control of a corporation.
The control block held by the person is either a controlling block in
itself (over 5096 under most charters or articles of incorporation), or a
block that is not a controlling block by itself, but without which the
raider cannot acquire a controlling interest.'
This is not the case when individual stockholders who are part of a
"fluid aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders"' are the "holders" of a
controlling interest. Each individual stockholder suffers no real harm by
a single party purchasing a controlling interest as the individual stock-
holder never had a controlling interest. Although a controlling interest
may result from the sale of many non-controlling shares, none of the un-
affiliated shareholders had the power to control the corporation that they
could sell or exercise, in short, nothing that would warrant a control
premium. The stockholder was not part of a group that voted together,
and the tender offer transaction may have been the only time this partic-
ular majority ever voted together. The same damage to the stockholder's
voting power could have occurred if 50.1% of the outstanding share-
holders of independently held stock decided to enter into a voting agree-
293. See generaUy O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 189, § 4:02 (discussing transac-
tional settings for control premiums).
294. See Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43, 51.
295. For a discussion of the various contexts in which payment of a control premi-
urn arises, see O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 189, § 4.03.
296. For example, if 40% of the stock of a company were held by the public at
large, 3096 by the founder and chairman, and 2096 by the vice-president, or some
other insider, either the chairman's block or the vice-president's block could give the
raider a controlling interest after the public stockholders tendered into a tender offer.
Either party could demand a control premium if the other party were unwilling to
sell.
297. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994).
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ment or create a voting pool. It is still possible for the stockholder to
vote for either the majority or the minority view in any decision. This
was no more or less possible when the stock was held by a "fluid aggre-
gation of independent shareholders."' A control premium to an inde-
pendent shareholder, therefore, need not represent a loss of control,
because the shareholder never had control to lose. Control is still based
on the willingness to vote with the majority on a particular issue, and
that ability has not diminished in the slightest by the purchase of a con-
trolling block by another party.w
Thus, the shareholder has lost protection from the possibility of abuse
by the majority through a cash-out merger or otherwise.' This is the
one case where a legitimate distinction arises between the new majority
stockholder's interests and the remaining minority shareholders' inter-
ests. The majority stockholder will by nature differ from those of the
minority, since the majority will want to pay as little as possible, and the
minority will want to receive as much as possible for outstanding shares
the majority seeks to purchase. This is why the court imposes such a
high duty of care on the majority in cash-out mergers."0 ' The courts
must make certain that the minority receives the proper value for its
shares when the majority has the ability to overpower it.
The shareholders are not, however, entitled to receive the highest
possible compensation for their shares in all circumstances, especially if
they will possess the power to vote in the future. Furthermore, it is not
necessary for the board to maximize short-term over long-term share
value because the remaining shareholders could feasibly continue to be
shareholders and reap long-term benefits. 2 If, at some time in the fu-
298. Id
299. As previously discussed, when an identifiable entity or affiliation holds a con-
trolling interest in a target without which a suitor cannot obtain control, the suitor
may be willing to pay a "control premium" for that share. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON,
supra note 189, § 4.02. The ability of the suitor to pay this premium, however, disap-
pears if the suitor has to pay the premium to a/ the shareholders. Id. § 4.03(B).
Moreover, there would be no reason to pay any "premium," if the suitor could obtain
control simply by offering to purchase all the corporation's stock at a price to which
the stockholders at large would agree. Any "premium" would be included in the offer
price and would in fact be no premium at all, but only a determination of market
price for the shares.
300. There was no such threat before the shareholders tendered precisely because
there was no. identifiable majority stockholder.
301. See supra notes 284-88 and accompanying text (describing the "entire fairness"
standard established in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983)).
302. In the actual Paramount-Viacom transaction, there was no intent to go com-
pletely private and no ability to do so even if the desire had been present The
shareholders in the back end of the deal, or others who have purchased since then,
though now a minority, will continue to benefit from dividends and an increase in
their stock value if the company can improve its performance and profitability.
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ture, the majority seeks to cash-out the minority, the Weinberger rules
would require entire fairness and the minority would be protected.'
So what about cases where the new majority does intend to cash-out
the minority? The court might just as well require a premium as part of
the auction instead. The problem with this formulation of the original
deal is that there is no cap on the potential price of the merger. In a
cash-out merger, the court will require that the majority give the minority
a reasonable control premium.' This reasonableness requirement can
act as both a minimum and a maximum amount. No such limitation ex-
ists in an auction, which will be governed not by what is reasonable
under the circumstances, but by which suitor wants the target more.'
Even more relevant, in the leveraged purchase situation neither is playing
with real money. The higher the bidding, the more likely the raider is
buying on credit, leverage based on the target's projected profits, and not
its own treasure chest. In effect, an auction between two raiders using
leveraged bids is a battle to see who can spend more of the target's mon-
ey.
Therefore, lenders and investors alone determine the limits of the war.
These entities attempt to predict which bidder will have a more profit-
able future, especially since no lender would provide cash to a newly
merged company unless it believed the forthcoming profits would be
sufficient to service the amount of leverage necessary to acquire it. When
institutional lenders supply cash, this may be a far more scrutinizing test
than a court would ever apply. However, as one of the few remaining
legacies of the eighties, this leverage may not be provided by institutional
lenders, but instead by the general public through highly leveraged bonds
or other similar debt instruments.
303. See supra note 284-88 and accompanying text.
304. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 189, § 5.04.
305. This is often more an ego contest between the controlling individuals than a
representation of the "fair market value" of the company. One popular modem merg-
er and acquisition novel provides a particularly good demonstration of how interper-
sonal conflicts can shape merger negotiations. See generally PETER F. HARTz, MERGER
(1985) (recounting the 1982 Bendix/Martin Marietta takeover and the conflict between
Bill Agee, Chairman and CEO of Bendix Corp., and Thomas Pownall, President and
CEO of Martin Marietta). There may also exist a sort of one-upmanship on the part
of raiders in general who want to have the newest and biggest deal to hit the head-
lines. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 13, at 200 (noting that "the arrogance and
ego of corporate raiders, seeking to do a bigger or better deal than the one just
announced in the financial press, may also have helped fuel the takeover wave").
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Therefore, by requiring an open auction, the court is endorsing the use
of junk bonds, and highly speculative junk bonds at that, since most
auctions will involve leveraged bidders who will each drive the other to
greater and greater leverage in order to "win." The emerging company
will not only find itself in a much more precarious position, but will be
much less likely to benefit the economy as a whole." Viacom itself pro-
vides evidence of this phenomenon.'
When a board is faced with competing bids and must choose which to
recommend to the shareholders, or whether to recommend any action at
all, it should first evaluate the situation from as many different vantage
points as possible. It should then recommend to the stockholders the
transaction that will provide them with the highest short-term price for
their shares, and will place the corporation in the best position to ex-
pand and grow toward previously established long-term goals. This evalu-
ation will involve an intricate balance between similar bids, exactly the
kind of analysis that the court would ordinarily leave to the discretion of
the board of directors when the business judgment rule applies. The
court's presumption, that the directors operated in an honest belief that
their actions were in the best interest of the company and their decisions
were informed and made in good faith, would settle the issue and end
the court's inquiry. Such a highly deferential view, however, is inappro-
priate in these cases because of the intrinsic conflict of interest. Though
equally inappropriate to apply a blind duty to auction, there exists an
intermediate position that will more adequately serve the interests con-
cerned.
The court should continue to approach the decisions of a target board
in response to a merger or acquisition offer with the deference of the
business judgment rule, but only after a threshold inquiry, much like that
used in Unocal.' This threshold inquiry must satisfy the court's con-
cerns that it is the interests of stockholders, and not the board's self-
interest, that motivate the board's actions. This inquiry must support the
foundational concepts of the business judgment rule: that the board act-
ed with care, loyalty, independence, and adequate information."
306. One leading practitioner in the field predicted that the hostile tender offers of
the eighties would put our banking system and credit markets in jeopardy. Upton,
supra note 5. Though the Savings and Loan crisis was brought on by many other
causes, his insights have turned out to be surprisingly accurate. See id.
307. See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text (discussing the fate of auc-
tioned companies).
308. See generally Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (1985).
309. Two authors have suggested that Paramount v. QVC represents the first signs
that the court is departing from rigid rules construing a Revlon duty or other specific
duties. Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law
After QVC and Technicolor A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?),
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In cases such as this, when the board's actions are initially suspect due
to the intrinsic conflict of interest between its self preservation instincts
and what may or may not be in the best interests of stockholders, a two
part inquiry would satisfy the initial requisites of the business judgment
rule. First, did the board have a reasonable basis for believing that the
stockholders would benefit from a transaction with this suitor more than
a transaction with any other likely suitor? Second, was the board's pro-
cess of acquiring information and reaching its conclusion sufficient to
provide a reasonable basis for its conclusion?."
An affirmative response to these two questions will confirm that the
target board was acting with care and loyalty and from an informed posi-
tion necessary to justify an application of the presumption provided by
the business judgment rule."' The first question will require a specific
enumeration of the factors that influenced the board's decision, but will
not permit the court to interfere with the deliberative process. The inqui-
ry is simply whether there was a reasonable basis for the board to con-
clude as it did. If, as the court indicated, the duty to auction was merely
a more specific enumeration of what a board must do to support its duty
of loyalty to the corporation and the stockholders, the standard suggest-
ed here will merely validate the truth of the court's statement that there
49 Bus. LAW. 1593 (1994). They assert that these cases reflect a new unified standard
in Delaware corporate law that will eventually do away with specific Revlon or
Unocal frameworks for analysis: "[N]ot only are breaches of the duties of care and
loyalty treated similarly, but sales of control, defensive tactics, and other extraordi-
nary management decisions having a significant practical impact on stockholder inter-
ests are all potentially united under a single intermediate standard of enhanced scruti-
ny." Id. at 1596. Though these authors do not endorse such a position, Cunningham
and Yablon correctly note that in Paramount v. QVC, the court was primarily con-
cerned that the board uphold its general fiduciary duties of care and loyalty toward
the stockholders. Id. at 1595-96. The threshold questions offered in this Comment
also share this as their primary focus and the solution proposed seeks to accomplish
these ends.
310. This formulation of a threshold test for the business judgment rule is because
it is derived from the court's language in Paramount v. QVC in which the court
described what goes into an enhanced scrutiny test See Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d
34, 45 (Del. 1994).
311. A key part of this confirmation focuses on the process- through which the
board comes to maing its decision, thereby addressing the concerns of the court in
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see Kreider, supra note 26, at 637-38
(analyzing the duties imposed by Van Gorkom). See generally Thomas C. Wagner,
Note, The Business Judgment Rule Imposes Procedural Requirements on Corporate
Directors--Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985), 14 FA. ST. U.L. REv.
109 (1986).
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The court's conclusions in Paramount v. QVC result from the perspec-
tive from which it approached the case, not clearly stated until well into
its reasoning. Once the court concluded that an auction took place, it
was clear that Paramount's board treated the bidders unequally and,
therefore, failed to uphold its Revlon duties. This does not mean, howev-
er, that the court properly applied existing precedent or chose a course
of action that would most fully benefit either stockholders or society at
large.
The business judgment rule and the principle it supports, that directors
are generally in a better position to make decisions for a corporation
than a court, need not be abdicated in change of control transactions un-
less evidence exits that the board actually took steps that were in the
directors' own interests rather than the best interests of the corporation
or stockholders. A test that ensures that the board is upholding its du-
ties, rather than an unqualified statement that the highest short-term
value is always in the shareholders' "best interest" would much more
adequately address the problem. The auction requirement as it presently
exists discourages long-range planning, diminishes the possibility of con-
sensual mergers, forces companies into a much more leveraged position
than is otherwise necessary, and harms rather than benefits the minority
shareholders of the resulting corporation.
On its face, the quote at the beginning of this Article describes the
high profile deal makers of the eighties, but also describes a very differ-
ent and very distinguished group of modem jurists. Those who took part
in the merger and acquisition frenzy of the eighties adopted policies that
in the short-term appeared justified, but in the long-run caused damage
to society and individual stockholders. In short, business leaders forgot
that the policies of controlling business should be aimed at doing busi-
ness.
At least the corporate power players seem to have taken heed of the
lesson, as evidenced by the number of strategic mergers in the nineties
compared to the number of bust-ups of the eighties. The direction of
recent decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court, however, have not
reflected this enlightenment. Imposing a duty to maximize short-term
shareholder value through an auction appears to satisfy the short-term
problem. When the court orders greater compensation for an aggregate
312. Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 44 (citing Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567
A.2d 1279, 1286-87 (Del. 1989)).
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of unaffiliated shareholders, the result is satisfying and leaves the impres-
sion that justice prevailed. It does not, however, take the practical func-
tioning of business into account. Unfortunately, the current judicial poli-
cies that control business do not take into account those who are actual-
ly doing business and who must continue doing business for the econo-
my to survive.
ROBERT D. MING
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